

**Isaiah Bowman: Request to the Name Review Board
The Johns Hopkins University**

Petitioners: Sanford Jacoby, Distinguished Research Professor of History, Management, and Public Affairs, UCLA; Laurel Leff, Professor of Journalism and Associate Director, Jewish Studies Program, Northeastern University; Paige Glotzer, Assistant Professor and John W. and Jeanne M. Rowe Chair in the History of American Politics, Institutions, and Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Material in this report may not be used without permission. ⁺



September 2023

To Members of the Name Review Board:

We write to request that Johns Hopkins University withdraw the public honors it bestows on Isaiah Bowman, one of the university's former presidents. We ask that his bust be placed in storage but pedestal retained with a QR code, and that Bowman Drive be renamed. Demoting Bowman is consistent with the university's values and your committee's concern with moral leadership. There would be no legal consequences from these actions.

We are three historians who during the course of our research encountered Isaiah Bowman and the disturbing facets of his life. One of us is a Hopkins graduate and a scholar of racial issues of the twentieth century. Another has published books that discuss reactions in the United States to the plight of European refugees and the American media's coverage of anti-Jewish Nazi violence. The third has studied the plight of Jews in Germany during the Nazi years.

Simply put, Isaiah Bowman was a virulent white supremacist and antisemite. What distinguished him from other of the era's elite university presidents was not his obnoxious ideas, although he was an extremist, but actions derived from them. Also, his ambit was wider. His misdeeds went beyond the university to the State Department's highest reaches. There he helped develop policies on refugees from Naziism before and during the Second World War. There is the grave possibility that he put lives in danger.

While other university presidents gradually adapted to social and legal changes regarding African Americans and Jews, Bowman steered Johns Hopkins in the opposite direction. This was due in part to his lifelong embrace of scientific racism, an ideology infused with eugenic ideas, and his long-standing antisemitism. He damaged the university's reputation several times during his presidency as a result of actions driven by his prejudices.

We have laid out in detail the deeply problematic aspects of his career in the attached report that is the product of three years of research. We believe that members of the Johns Hopkins community have been unaware of the full scope of Bowman's bigotry. We hope that based on these facts, you will accept our request that the university no longer honor Isaiah Bowman.

Sincerely,

Paige Glotzer, Assistant Professor and John W. and Jeanne M. Rowe Chair in the History of American Politics, Institutions, and Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison

Sanford Jacoby, Distinguished Research Professor of History, Management, and Public Affairs, UCLA

Laurel Leff, Professor of Journalism and Associate Director, Jewish Studies Program, Northeastern University

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report advocates that Johns Hopkins University discontinue the public honors it bestows on its former president Isaiah Bowman (1935-1948). We ask that the university place his bust in storage, retain the pedestal on which it sits in its present spot, and place upon it a bronze or crystal box with a QR code linked to sophisticated historical sources on the forces that shaped Bowman's career. We also ask that Bowman Drive, which runs through the Homewood campus, be renamed. The full range of Bowman's condemnable deeds is not well known at Johns Hopkins. Our report presents the entire story.

The philosopher Susan Neiman has written, "Monuments are values made visible." The university's principles state that Johns Hopkins seeks to build an inclusive community where every person has equal dignity and worth. Bowman was the antithesis of those aspirations. Removing the bust and changing the road's name will signal that the university wants to make its values visible.

The Charges

White Supremacy. Bowman held virulently racist views, including a belief in a racial hierarchy with whites at the summit. He warned of threats to American civilization posed by the demographic replacement of Anglo-Saxons by African Americans and immigrants. To minimize the problem, he endorsed strict immigration quotas for southern and eastern Europeans and a ban on Asian immigration. He also fought vigorously to keep African Americans out of Johns Hopkins, even as peer universities began halting steps towards racial inclusion. After the Second World War, he joined a group of southern university presidents who criticized government efforts at promoting racial equality in higher education. He fired a faculty member because his spouse published articles critical of his racial policies.

Endangering Victims of Naziism. Bowman undermined, stalled, and blocked the rescue of Europeans trying to escape the Nazis, most of them Jews. They included refugee scholars seeking positions at US universities, including Johns Hopkins, and thousands of others whose settlement in Latin America he tried to prevent. He failed to assist two fellow geographers imprisoned by the Nazis, despite requests for help. As an advisor on refugees to President Roosevelt and the State Department, he aided and abetted the catastrophe. Historians consider him to have been the State Department's worst antisemite.

Discrimination Against Jewish Faculty and Students. Bowman was deeply antisemitic and dabbled in history's ugliest slanders about Jews. He secretly instituted a quota on Jewish undergraduates, previous to which Johns Hopkins had had no limit. He did this at a time when several of the university's peers were moving in the opposite direction. He deceived a Jewish donor and the Anti-Defamation League by denying there were quotas. He fired or repelled from the university outstanding Jewish scholars. Because of Bowman, Johns Hopkins lost a Nobel Prize winner, a future Nobelist, two eminent scientists, three of the era's finest historians, and others. His antisemitism was so all-consuming that he was willing to risk the university's stature.

Eugenics. Beginning early in his career, Isaiah Bowman was immersed in the era's eugenics movement that had race as a principal concern. Before moving to Johns Hopkins, he ran the American Geographical Society for twenty years, through which he publicized eugenic claims that placed nonwhite people at the bottom of a racial hierarchy. At the next level were immigrants--Catholics and Jews from southern and eastern Europe--who were regarded as inferior to whites from northwest Europe. Bowman

repeatedly said that African Americans were inherently lazy and intellectually deficient, while Jews by nature were greedy. His contempt for nonwhite people was demonstrated early in his life when he whipped an Indigenous person for refusing to guide his expedition in Peru.

The University's Principles

In 2021, Johns Hopkins took a significant step by establishing a Name Review Board, an entity entrusted with the responsibility of deliberating on the removal, renaming, or replacement of controversial campus iconography. Below the guidelines are underlined, followed by an explanation of their relevance to Isaiah Bowman.

1. The centrality of offensive behavior to his life. Throughout his career, Bowman deprecated a multitude of peoples he viewed as inferior: Asian, Black, Jewish, Gay and Indigenous peoples. Awful as his attitudes were, what was worse were the harmful actions resulting from them.

2. The severity of his conduct. Judged by the standards of his day, Bowman stood out among his peers, albeit for the wrong reasons. He denied Black students opportunities at Johns Hopkins and instituted a quota on Jewish students at a time when other schools were moving in the opposite direction. Bowman lied about the quota's existence. He fired or drove away eminent Jewish scholars and others. He made it more difficult for those fleeing Naziism, most of them Jews, to find places of refuge. Bowman may have put lives at risk. Today he is best remembered for his racism and antisemitism and receives little recognition for his contributions as a geographer and university president.

3. Relationship to the university. As a former president, Bowman inevitably played a part in the university's history. However, his dark side overwhelmed his achievements, such as they were. Bowman was far from being a moral leader.

4. Legal responsibilities. The university currently recognizes Isaiah Bowman with a bust in Shriver Hall and a road named for him. The bust is a gift from a donor. It was a stipulation in the donor's gift. The university determined that it was legally permissible to remove murals that were another stipulation in the same gift, thus establishing a precedent. The origins of the road's name are unknown. It was neither the result of a donor request nor action by the trustees. Thus, there would be no legal consequences from renaming. Bowman's life is well documented. He will not be forgotten if public honors are withdrawn.

Recently, a number of schools removed former presidents' names from campus buildings. They include Bryn Mawr College, Caltech, George Washington University, Indiana University, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Princeton University, the University of Southern California, and the University of Vermont. Caltech eliminated the name of its founding president and Nobel Prize winner because he endorsed eugenic sterilization. Its current president acknowledged that it is fraught to judge individuals outside their time but not if they had engaged in "morally reprehensible" behavior. He added, "How Caltech is experienced by current and future generations of outstanding scholars hinges on our ability to understand our past and underscore our values. The renamings will help position the Institute to retain and attract the most talented and innovative researchers [including students] from every background." We hope that you decide that the same holds true for Johns Hopkins University.

Introduction to the Report

This report requests that Johns Hopkins University cease publicly honoring Isaiah Bowman, its president from 1935 to 1948. We ask that the university place his bust in storage, retain the pedestal, and place upon it a bronze box with a QR code linked to historical sources on the issues that shaped Bowman's career. We also ask that Bowman Drive be renamed.

The report is roughly chronological. There are six parts, each of which is preceded by a brief summary.

- I. The American Geographical Society
- II. Rescuing Refugee Scholars
- III. Faculty and Students at Johns Hopkins
- IV. Refugees and Bowman's Government Service
- V. Final Years
- VI. Bowman Drive and the Bowman Bust
- Conclusions
- Notes

I. American Geographical Society, 1915-1935

Summary: Early in his career, Isaiah Bowman became immersed in the era's eugenics movement. He ran the American Geographical Society (AGS) for twenty years, from 1915 to 1935, during which time the AGS subsidized and disseminated the writings of prominent eugenic racists who were among Bowman's closest colleagues. His beliefs aligned with theirs: the existence of a racial hierarchy, threats posed to white supremacy by African Americans and recent immigrants, and appeals to science to legitimate these ideas, which he held on to long after they had been scientifically discredited.

Isaiah Bowman received his PhD in geography from Yale in 1909 and was an assistant professor there until the geography department closed in 1915. He then found a job as president of the AGS, a position he held until 1935. While at the AGS he was hired by Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson's advisor, as chief territorial specialist for the US at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. He provided advice to top US officials on the design of postwar borders. Based on that experience, Bowman wrote *The New World: Problems in Political Geography* (1921), a blockbuster that went through several translations and four editions. It was intended for a wide audience—business, government, academia, students, and the general public. (Bowman considered adapting the book for high school students.) The title captured the postwar mood so well that five other books with the same title were published between 1918 and 1921. Bowman's *The New World* was the most widely noticed and brought him recognition in the US and abroad.¹*

* Academic reviews of *The New World* were mixed. A distinguished Hungarian geographer was unimpressed: "A geographer has written the book, but I cannot say that it is scientific. The book is not geography; it is a popular manual for politicians." Bowman's writings have not stood the test of time. Recently geographer Saul B. Cohen

The AGS for decades had been an organization of wealthy armchair explorers. After Bowman took the helm, he maintained its focus on exploration while building up the society as a research institution. Mapmaking proliferated, overseas scholars visited, and Bowman launched an academic journal called *Geographical Review*. As part of the new orientation, Bowman aligned the AGS with the era's eugenic movement. Using the society's resources, he bolstered the visibility of eugenic enthusiasts, thereby valorizing their claims. Within his personal network were numerous eugenicists.* They included fanatics such as Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, and Charles S. Crane, each of whom served as AGS Councillors (trustees) under Bowman. By the end of the 1920s, Bowman was known in eugenic circles, although he was discreet and never a public leader.** After moving to Johns Hopkins, he maintained ties to several of the eugenicists in his circle.²***

The racial wing of the eugenics movement rested on allegedly scientific assertions. Genetic factors created permanent racial groups arranged in hierarchies of desirable traits including intelligence and work ethic. At the summit were northwestern Europeans variously designated as Anglo-Saxons, Aryans, Nordics, or Teutons. Recent immigrants were somewhere in the middle and nonwhites sat at the bottom. Racial type was measured by anthropometric features such as hair type, cranial capacity, and skin color. When white people married those from inferior races, their offspring dropped in the racial hierarchy. This assemblage of ideas, and others, has been called "scientific racism."

Scientific racism had policy implications, including immigration restriction, anti-miscegenation laws, and practices such as forced sterilization and birth control. In the US, its intent was to preserve the relative size of the white population and reduce the number of offspring of those deemed unfit. During the 1920s and increasingly thereafter, scientific racism was discredited as pseudoscience. But a few clung to its tenets, including Bowman. It was a thread that would run throughout his entire career.³

said that Bowman's scholarly publications were "amateurish" and that *The New World* was merely "an encyclopedia of facts." Another geographer, Barney Warf, notes that Bowman was "not one of the discipline of geography's intellectual giants [and] is not known for his academic work."

* Bowman had relationships with, among others, Robert C. Cook, Robert L. Dickinson, Douglas S. Freeman, Madison Grant, John W. Gregory, Aleš Hrdlička, Ellsworth Huntington, W.C. Jackson, Herbert Jennings, Albert G. Keller, Henry Fairfield Osborn, Frederick H. Osborn, George H. Parker, A. Grenfell Price, William Z. Ripley, Lothrop Stoddard, Griffith Taylor, and William A. White.

** Bowman was one of seventy people invited to the 2nd Conference of the Foundation for Research in Population, held in 1931. There was created the Population Association of America, which in its early years included proponents of birth control, forced sterilization, immigration restriction, and scientific racism.

*** Charles S. Crane knew Bowman from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where he served as a government advisor. He later urged President Roosevelt to support Nazi Germany as "a bulwark of Christian culture." Stoddard was the author of *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* (1920), which warned that differential fertility rates between the white and "colored" races would bring an end to Western civilization. He advocated forced sterilization. After Bowman became president of Johns Hopkins, Stoddard asked him if he could teach a course there on world affairs, although there's no evidence that he actually did. He touted a book he had just published, *Clashing Tides of Color* (1935), which warned of the Japanese threat to white supremacy, an issue of interest to Bowman. Bowman invited him to lunch.

Those closest to Bowman were three scientific racists: Madison Grant, Ellsworth Huntington, and Griffith Taylor. Grant was an attorney, conservationist, and author of a popular and notoriously racist book, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916). It was filled with claims about Nordic superiority and the flawed characteristics of other races. Black Africans were the most deficient, a “stationary species and they do not possess the potentiality of progress or initiative from within.” Recent Jewish immigrants had a peculiar mentality, he said, and were ruthlessly concentrated on self-interest. Bowman wrote that Grant’s book would force geographers to look beyond the physical environment and pay attention to “the primal and inheritable qualities of race.” Despite Grant’s exceptionally racist views, Bowman approved his reappointment as an AGS councillor six times between 1917 and 1932.

Huntington and Taylor were academic geographers, both interested in race, environment, intelligence, and eugenics. Huntington had been a Yale geography professor alongside Bowman. Later, he served four years as president of the American Eugenics Society. In 1915, Huntington wrote that his scientific studies at the Hampton Institute, a training school for African Americans, showed that racial differences in “mentality” were “ineradicable” because “the brain of the white man is more complex than that of his black brother.” In Central and South America, “the Indians . . . are very backward . . . dull of mind and slow to adopt new ideas.” Taylor taught at the universities of Chicago, Sydney, and Toronto. He was keen on anthropometry and touted its “scientific” findings. He claimed that his studies justified white supremacy and its association with cultural and scientific achievements, even civilization itself. Black people, said Taylor, had a “primitive characteristic [of] childlike behavior” in contrast to the “white races” who were “versatile, gay, and inventive.”

As editor of the *Geographical Review*, Bowman published 25 articles by Huntington and 21 by Taylor. He regularly performed favors for them and for Grant. When Grant’s *Passing of the Great Race* first came out, the *Geographical Review* published colored “race maps” derived from the book that charted the geographical locations of the Nordic race and the “more backward” races. The AGS also prepared race maps for Taylor’s publications. In 1933 Grant published *Conquest of the Continent, or The Expansion of Races in America*, an even more racist book than his first. Its thesis was that African Americans had damaged America’s white civilization from the moment the first slave ships arrived. Bowman preferred not to review the book in *Geographical Review*, concerned that the ailing Grant would be hurt by what Bowman feared might be harsh judgments. Instead, he instructed the AGS to distribute circulars announcing the book’s publication. *Conquest* alarmed Jewish and African American organizations. “Substitute Aryan for Nordic,” said the *New York Times*, “and a good deal of Mr. Grant’s argument would lend itself without much difficulty to the support of some recent pronouncements in Germany.”⁴

Bowman recapitulated his colleagues’ seemingly scientific ideas. In *The New World* he wrote that “the pure-blooded negro [has] a plastic and imitative temperament. As one writer put it: he has never founded a stone city, or built a ship, or produced a literature, or suggested a creed.” The AGS published three of Bowman’s books, including one about the 1911 Yale Peruvian Expedition. In it, Bowman made a number of ugly racial remarks, such as one claiming a mixed-race person’s “stupidity” was the result of insufficient “white blood” and another in which he called Indigenous Andeans “clods,” albeit ethical. The most disturbing passage was one in which he recounted administering

punishment to an Indigenous man who refused to be his guide. “All my threatening was useless and I had to force myself to beat him into submission with my quirt [riding whip].” The brutality is stunning. In the US, the last legally beaten servant was probably a slave.⁵

Hair type was of particular interest to Bowman, Grant, Huntington, and Taylor. Writing in the *Geographical Review*, Taylor claimed that hair texture and color were correlated with intelligence, with Negro hair the crudest. He said that Negro hair was “on a lower plane than white or Mongolian.” When Bowman received a paper on “The Microscopic Structure of the Hair as an Aid in Race Determination,” he sent it to Madison Grant and suggested that he publish it in a journal he edited.⁶ *

Twenty years later Bowman remained in the grip of these ideas. In late 1943, he became part of a State Department group tasked with preparing the department’s recommendations about the nascent United Nations. A crucial issue was the future of the world’s colonies and the quest for self-determination by their inhabitants. Bowman argued that the preservation of colonialism was necessary until tens of millions of “primitive” colonial subjects were capable of ruling themselves. Civilized government “is not within their range.” Democracy “may be an established fact in the United States” but “for other peoples [it is] a reward to be obtained after a long and painful process of education.” Practical details of oil and other resources were beyond their understanding, he said, which “put[s] the white man into a condition of superiority and power.” And then Bowman referred to the hair of the nonwhite subalterns: “The *fuzzy-wuzzies* of the world do not understand Jeffersonian democracy and are accustomed to authority, not to the Australian ballot system.”⁷ **

The era’s eugenicists feared that falling birth rates among what Madison Grant called “the most valuable classes” would cause their replacement by nonwhites and “fast breeding” immigrants. Like Grant, Bowman said that the problem was that Black people, “undoubtedly inferior, on the average, to the white” in the future would outpace whites in “numerical supremacy.” Immigrants were a similar threat. “The birthrate among the foreign population is higher than among other classes,” said Bowman, “[and] we may well wonder if the United States may not become a congeries of races like Europe and yield at last to the same divisive influences.”⁸ ***

* Bowman never lost his sensitivity to physical features that he associated with race. While he was president of Johns Hopkins, “a woman came to his office for an interview; she was representing some scholarly organization. Before he would begin answering her questions, he had some questions of his own. Apparently, something about her appearance made him suspect that she was something other than 100 percent Caucasian. So he bluntly asked what her ethnic background was. She tried to brush him off and get to the purpose of their meeting, but Bowman refused to be put off and she ultimately refused to answer his questions. He then stood up and declared that their interview was over and showed her to the door, after which he dictated his memo to the file.”

** Fuzzie Wuzzie (or Fuzzy Wuzzy) is a racial slur. Its first modern use was in an 1892 poem by Rudyard Kipling about the Sudanese warriors who fought against the British. Nazi medical researchers, drawing on scientific racism, conducted experiments on hair clipped from those slated for extermination.

*** Karl Pearson, statistician and eugenicist, had earlier expressed the same fears about Britain, which he believed was “ceasing as a nation to breed intelligence” because of declining birth rates among the “cultured classes” as compared to the larger families of the “incapables.” In June 2020, University College London announced the denaming of its Pearson Building and Pearson Lecture Theatre. The university’s president said

Demographic replacement led to the issue of miscegenation. Like other eugenicists, Bowman worried that the “mixture of races goes on with increasing momentum and it is chiefly the lower elements that are involved in the process.” In the *Geographical Review*, Ellsworth Huntington wrote that “white blood is generally needed in order [for a person] to insure even moderate success.” Madison Grant was especially concerned about Black-white marriages but also worried about Jewish intermarriage, which, he said, threatened to “poison the blood.” On New York’s Lower East Side, Grant found “amazing racial hybrids and some ethnic horrors.” Among them were “Polish Jews, whose dwarf stature, peculiar mentality, and ruthless concentration on self-interest are being engrafted upon the stock of the nation . . . [The] man of the old stock . . . is today being literally driven off the streets of New York City by the swarms of Polish Jews. They adopt the language of the native American, they wear his clothes, they steal his name, and they are beginning to take his women.” This is from the book that Bowman touted.

Bowman had a habit of letting others speak for him, as with the articles he selected for the *Geographical Review* and the books he praised. In *The New World*, he provided a bibliography for further reading, which recommended only two books on the topic of immigration’s social effects. One was *The Old World and the New* (1914) by Edward A. Ross, a well-known sociologist, eugenicist, and antisemite. In the same lurid language as Grant’s, Ross’s book offered anthropometric observations of Jewish immigrants in New York. “In every face there was something wrong—lips thick, mouth coarse, upper lip too long. Cheekbones too high, chin poorly formed, the bridge of the nose hollowed, the base of the nose tilted, or else the whole face prognathous.” The other book Bowman endorsed was *The Trend of the Race: A Study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind* (1921). The author, zoologist Samuel J. Holmes, was an anti-miscegenation activist who, like Ross, favored compulsory sterilization of inferior people. *The New World* was assigned by the Army for its officers to read, while the State Department distributed the book to consular offices around the world.⁹

An issue of utmost importance to Bowman and other scientific racists was stanching the influx of so-called new immigrants. A swath of white America felt similarly after the First World War. Congress passed an immigration act in 1921 that established a quota system, followed by a 1924 law that privileged immigrants from northwest Europe while greatly curtailing quotas for southern and eastern Europeans and Asians. Many Americans in favor of immigration restriction had economic concerns, whereas Bowman and his associates framed non-Nordic immigration as a threat to the foundations of white society. Madison Grant was credited as a driving force behind the 1924 law.

Bowman painted a grim picture of the trends underway. “At first our immigrants were chiefly from northern Europe. Lately they have been from southern and eastern Europe . . . About half of our entire population is reputed to be Anglo-Saxon by race. All this is changing, and the change is taking place now. It affects not only our political forms and social institutions, but also the quality of our people.” Elsewhere he said, “The state of education and the intellectual character of the populations of southern and eastern Europe dilute and weaken our national character.” Strict limits on immigration

that “although UCL is a very different place than it was in the 19th century, any suggestion that we celebrate these ideas or the figures behind them creates an unwelcoming environment for many in our community.”

were the solution. He described the 1921 act as “timely and it had long been needed, if only to give a better chance for examining the newcomers as to fitness.” Holmes had recommended “mental tests” for arriving aliens so as to exclude “everybody below the level of a high-grade moron.” Bowman went one better, casting the aversion to immigrants as patriotic. “America is still the best hope of the world,” he wrote. “The foreigner may realize this fact more clearly if he finds the privilege of entry more difficult to obtain.”¹⁰

Bowman bore a particular animus toward Asian peoples. According to historian William T. Rowe, Bowman “was an adamant supporter of the Exclusion Acts against immigration by East Asians, whom he saw as polluting America's superior racial legacy.” The Oriental Exclusion Act was passed in 1924 as part of the larger immigration act. It extended an earlier ban on Chinese immigration to include other Asian people, primarily from Japan. Bowman cautioned that if Japanese immigration were not restricted “the white population would be submerged beneath a mounting wave of color.”¹¹

Not long after passage of the 1924 immigration act, Bowman was confronted by a new issue: refugees from Nazi Germany, the majority of them Jewish, seeking protection in the United States. Among the first calls for help came from European scholars threatened by the Nazis.

II. Rescuing Refugee Scholars

Summary: In April 1933, shortly after Hitler became chancellor, German universities fired almost all Jewish and other non-Aryan faculty. Isaiah Bowman was slow to help refugee scholars seeking to escape Nazi Germany. Until the end of 1938, he offered only one person a position at Johns Hopkins. He was more resistant to hiring refugee scholars than his predecessor. There were other university presidents who were courageous and compassionate when it came to employing refugees. Bowman also failed to assist a young geographer imprisoned in a Nazi labor camp as well as a prominent geographer headed for a concentration camp. He refused to sign a petition criticizing Poland’s treatment of Jewish university students and accepted an award from a Nazi-dominated geographical society.

Early Years. The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars was created in 1933 to serve as an intermediary between US colleges and universities and German scholars attempting to leave. The law permitted scholars to enter the United States with visas that did not count toward the quotas in the 1924 Act. To obtain a nonquota visa, however, the State Department preferred applicants to have received an employment offer of at least one year’s duration, later upped to two years. To encourage universities to make such offers, the committee typically paid half of a refugee’s salary and occasionally other expenses. The hiring institutions relied primarily on foundations to cover the balance, sometimes filling a gap with their own funds and donations, often from American Jews. The Emergency Committee was able to aid only a fraction of stranded scholars. Come 1939, around 25 percent of Jewish academics remained in Germany. Some managed to escape after that, either to the US or to other countries, at least until the exit door slammed shut in 1941. The rest died of natural causes, suicide, or murder. A few survived.¹²

Among the most committed academics was Alvin Johnson, founder of the New School. In 1934 he incorporated within the New School a University in Exile to serve as a home for refugee scholars. It became the New School's graduate program, whose faculty was almost entirely comprised of exile scholars. Johnson also helped refugee academics find positions elsewhere. In all, he aided over 180 people.

In 1936, Johnson convened a meeting of academicians to discuss the University in Exile. One of the speakers was Bowman, who urged the audience to proceed gradually and cautiously:

I believe that we can make a sound and logical approach to a solution and that we shall be satisfied with the consequences of a decision based on reason. But if, alternatively, we allow ourselves to bob up and down on waves of emotion [that would encourage hiring more refugees], we shall not arrive at any port but rather at the bottom of the sea.

Bowman advised that universities should proceed "slowly and experimentally and on a small scale." That same year, Alfred Cohn, a German-born cardiologist who served on the Emergency Committee's executive board, told Alvin Johnson that Bowman was better at opining on the refugee problem than taking action to solve it. "Bowman made me tired; there's no good telling people who are wet that it's raining."¹³

Joseph Sweetman Ames, Bowman's predecessor as president, was quick to respond to the crisis in Germany. He hired four refugee scholars between 1932 and 1934, when attacks on Jewish professors were on the rise, all as tenured professors. The first was Oswei Temkin, the medical historian, who was taken on by Henry E. Sigerist, who headed the Institute for the History of Medicine in the School of Medicine. Shortly after Hitler assumed power, Ames promised Joseph Mayer, a Hopkins chemistry professor, that he intended to employ three additional Jewish refugees. Ames kept his word. In the College, James Franck, a physicist and Nobel Prize winner, received an offer in 1934, as did Leo Spitzer, a classicist. Sweetman also hired a medical historian named Ludwig Edelstein, who, like Temkin, went to Sigerist's institute. After *Kristallnacht*, Sigerist hired two additional refugees into nontenured positions. Each was at the institute for five years. * That Sigerist employed four refugee scholars—two with tenure and two with relatively lengthy terms—is impressive.¹⁴

After Ames stepped down, the pace slackened. During Bowman's first three years in office, only one refugee was offered a position, the historian Theodor Ernst Mommsen, a Protestant appalled by Hitler's policies. Mommsen went to Yale instead. There was greater activity at other universities and colleges, as evidenced by the fact that the Emergency Committee awarded 40 percent of its grants during this period.¹⁵ **

* One of the two nontenured people Sigerist assisted was Otto Neustätter, who was at the institute from 1938 until his death in 1943. The other was Erwin Ackernecht, a researcher from 1941 to 1946, at which time he received a tenured position at the University of Wisconsin. In addition to Sigerist's hires, the School of Medicine took on physicians who appear to have been German Jewish refugees. They included Walter Fleischmann, Heinz Herrmann, Ella Langer, Else Pappenheim, and Carl Traugott.

** The impetus to hire Mommsen came from Ludwig Edelstein, who pressed Bowman to give Mommsen a position. On his own Edelstein raised funds to support a fellowship for his old friend.

To understand Bowman's mindset at the time, we offer three anecdotes. One concerns a geographer imprisoned in Germany. Another is Bowman's response to attacks on Jewish university students in Poland, and the third has to do with an award he accepted from a German geographical society. The episodes demonstrate Bowman's antisemitism, reluctance to aid individuals suffering in Germany and Poland, and refusal to publicly criticize National Socialism.

Karl Wittfogel. In June 1933, Hubert R. Knickerbocker, an American journalist based in Berlin, was approached for help by the wife of Dr. Karl Wittfogel, a brilliant young geographer and China scholar with unorthodox left-wing views. Since the beginning of 1933, he had been held in Nazi concentration camps, including Dachau, and was in poor health. His wife told Knickerbocker that the *Geographical Review* had just published a favorable review of her husband's book on Chinese economic history and that the AGS had invited him to become a member. It might do some good, she said, if the AGS contacted German authorities to express its regret over the imprisonment of one of its members. Knickerbocker relayed Wittfogel's plight to John H. Finley, a fellow journalist who then was president of the AGS. Wittfogel, he said, "should enjoy at least the sympathy of scholars" and he asked that the AGS contact German officials to request Wittfogel's release. It was not uncommon at the time for requests like that to be made.

As president of the AGS, the decision on Wittfogel was Bowman's to make. On behalf of the AGS, he sent a curt reply to Knickerbocker: "The Society is unable to act on it." When the diplomat James G. McDonald visited Germany in August, this shortly before his appointment as the League of Nations' commissioner for European refugees, he met with Knickerbocker, who blasted Bowman for failing to lift a finger to help another geographer. Others acted when Bowman refused to do so. At the end of 1933, Wittfogel was released after geographers outside Germany appealed to the Nazis. He arrived at Columbia University with a grant from the Emergency Committee. In a biography of Bowman, the late Neil Smith notes that Bowman's "silence and refusal concerning a colleague's predicament [came] at a time when intervention might have made a difference."¹⁶

Poland. During the 1930s, Poland was moving in the same direction as Germany. In 1935, Polish universities instituted admissions quotas on Jewish students and segregated Jewish students by seating them in the rear of the classroom on what were called "ghetto benches." Jewish students who refused to comply were beaten or expelled. Come 1937, the *New York Times* reported that the number of Jewish university students in Poland was rapidly declining.

Dr. Stephen Duggan, head of the Emergency Committee, circulated a petition in the fall of 1937 condemning the ghetto benches and the "campaign of violence" against Jewish students and professors. The *Times* reported that there were 179 signatories, all non-Jews. In the group were 59 university and college presidents—including from Caltech, Cornell, and New York University, as well as from southern schools such as Duke, North Carolina, and Virginia. Five Nobel Prize winners also endorsed the statement. When Duggan contacted Isaiah Bowman, he refused to sign, telling Duggan it was time to "protest against protests" and unwise "to take the initiative in appeals that affect the internal situation of other countries."

In his reply to Bowman, Duggan was blunt about what was at stake. German and Polish antisemites were seeking “the destruction of every opportunity for [Jews] to secure an education.” He added that because “the doors of practically every other country were closed to Jews . . . such action looks to the destruction of the Jewish race itself.” This, he said, constituted “a crime not only against the culture but against humanity.” Bowman retorted “there are other minorities than the Jews” and asked Duggan, “Do you propose to be as active in their support? Or are you responding to the pressure of Jews in New York?” It was a callous and antisemitic remark.¹⁷

The Verein für Geographie und Statistik zu Frankfurt. This organization, one of Germany’s venerable geographic societies, held an event in December 1936 to mark its centenary. There it awarded honorary diplomas to Isaiah Bowman and four other geographers. German geographers knew Bowman well because of his leadership of the AGS, his role at the 1919 conference, and his book, *The New World*. Conversely, Bowman had been steeped in the writings of German geographers since his undergraduate days when he was an assistant to a prominent German geographer. German geographers resented Bowman’s views on geopolitics, which privileged US interests. However, they appreciated that *The New World’s* vision of America’s post-1918 global destiny drew from their own geopolitical ideas. They referred to him as “our” geopolitician.

After the Second World War, Albert Philippson, a prominent German Jewish geographer, estimated that over a third of the three dozen chaired geographers in Austria and Germany had been Nazis. Bowman had read their work, corresponded with them, and known a number of them personally. Thus, he was well aware of the post-1933 intertwining of academic German geography with the fascist government. The leading geographer with close ties to the Nazi regime was Karl Haushofer, who endorsed the Nazi slogan “blood and soil,” a phrase endorsing the creation of a pan-ethnic German state stretching from the German heartland to Russian lands. From this came Haushofer’s advocacy of aggressive expansionism to increase Germany’s *Lebensraum* (living space). It first happened in Austria in 1938 followed by the 1939 invasion of Poland. Bowman knew all about Haushofer and the fact that he had close ties to Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and other top German officials.

As an attendee of the International Geographical Congress (IGC) meetings in 1934 and 1938, Bowman witnessed the German contingent of fifty geographers wearing swastikas and espousing Haushofer-style geopolitics. A correspondent of Bowman’s was Ludwig Mecking, who represented the Reich government at the 1934 conference. Mecking even sent Bowman a congratulatory letter after he became the president of Johns Hopkins. Bowman owned copies of the publication *Raumforschung und Raumordnung* (spatial research), a geography journal edited by an organization established in 1935 directly under Hitler. Yet for some reason it was not until 1942 that Bowman publicly criticized his German colleagues and their land-hungry ideas. It happened when the press reported on similarities between *The New World* and German geopolitical theories. None of this is to say that Bowman agreed with the views espoused by his German colleagues. He did not. But his silence abetted the spread of their ideas.¹⁸

It was no secret that the Frankfurt *Verein's* president, geographer Walter Behrmann, was a Nazi supporter. In the 1936 *Festschrift* for the centenary, Behrmann wrote

If science is to thrive, it needs the protection of a strong hand, because science can only thrive with the fatherland, only with the size and strength of its power and leadership. So, trusting in the newly won unity and the strong hand of our Führer we want to express the German will and German renown with the utmost conviction. Heil Hitler!

The celebration was in keeping with Behrmann's predilections. The dinner speaker was Hjalmar Schacht, then the German Minister of Economics, who told the audience that "Germany has too little living space for its population," a problem, he said, that could be solved by returning its colonies and by settling Germans in eastern lands. He did not explain how this would be accomplished, although German geographers already were at work studying population transfers. Although Bowman did not attend the event, he accepted the diploma. At this time, some universities still maintained ties to German academic institutions, but others were severing theirs. In 1936, British universities refused to send delegates to celebrations at the University of Göttingen (its bicentennial) and the University of Heidelberg (its 550th anniversary). Morally, the right thing for Bowman to have done was to refuse an award from an organization colonized by Nazi supporters.*

Bowman had firsthand knowledge of the situation of German Jews. He made trips to Germany after the 1934 and 1938 IGC meetings. His 1934 travel notes mention witnessing Brownshirts marching in Berlin and a cryptic reference to "concentration camps." While in Germany in 1938 he sent a letter to Daniel Willard, chair of Johns Hopkins University's Board of Trustees, reporting on conversations he was having with Germans about what he referred to as "the Jewish business." The Germans, he wrote, grumbled that during the Weimar years Jews were given undeserved rights. They appeared in restaurants where they'd never been before, haggled loudly over prices, and in general were arrogant and demanding. Although Bowman told Willard that the sameness of the complaints suggested the influence of Nazi propaganda, he added the stunning words that "they may be right in spots."¹⁹

After Kristallnacht. Bowman finally took steps to aid refugee scholars following the violence of *Kristallnacht*. Other institutions also ramped up their efforts at this time. Over the next three years he agreed to take on seven refugees with Emergency Committee grants, all on short-term appointments. Four were kept for a year, two had their positions renewed for a second year, and one, the best of the

* Under the Third Reich, German universities and academic societies were eager to accord honors to foreign scholars whose ideas supported their own. In 1934, Henry Fairfield Osborn, founder of the American Eugenics Society, went to Germany to receive an honorary degree from the same university where the *Verein* was based. (Osborn, a friend of Bowman's, had received the AGS's Cullum Geographical Medal in 1919.) Two years later, on the occasion of its celebration, the University of Heidelberg awarded an honorary degree to Harry Laughlin, a cytologist and a fanatic racial eugenicist. Laughlin said the award was "evidence of a common understanding of German and American scientists of the nature of eugenics." That summer, Bowman asked Laughlin for a copy of his paper on the "science and art" of modern genetics in which Laughlin said that the foundation of eugenics is "the study of all agencies under social control, that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally." Bowman and Laughlin exchanged additional letters that year.

bunch, never went to Johns Hopkins because he took a permanent position elsewhere.* We don't know how much of Bowman's turnaround can be attributed to compassion, peer pressure, or the need to appear committed after his appointment in fall 1938 as one of President Roosevelt's advisors on refugees.²⁰

Bowman was sensitive to a refugee's religious background. In a letter to the Emergency Committee about Franz Michael, a China specialist, Bowman wrote, "Dr. Michael is part Jewish. He is a fine type of man." Michael was hired. Of Leo Waibel, a fellow geographer, Bowman said, "He is a gentile but married to a Jewess." Another hire was Paul Friedländer, a classical philologist. Two wealthy Baltimore Jews who were donors to Johns Hopkins (one was a trustee of the School of Medicine) reached out to Bowman and to the Emergency Committee, offering to pay half of Friedländer's salary if the committee paid the other half. Bowman then agreed to hire Friedländer for a one-year term. The cost to the university was nil and the donors would be pleased. Earlier, UCLA had offered Friedländer a job with the prospect of tenure, and when he received the offer, Bowman refused to match it, magnanimously telling the Emergency Committee that

Dr. Friedländer is the kind of man whom we would like to have at this University, and we cannot say enough in his praise. But his specialty is Greek, and we already have a Jew, Dr. [Harold] Cherniss, in the Department of Greek. In fact, he is the Department, except for junior assistants. We feel that it would not be wise to appoint a second person of the same faith. . . . Johns Hopkins has taken a disproportionately large number of refugees, and we do not want to overdo the matter lest there be repercussions.²¹

There were other academic officials who made much greater efforts to assist refugee scholars. One was the University of Chicago's president, Robert Maynard Hutchins. As of January 1938, Chicago had hired ten refugees, with appointments ranging from one year to "indefinite tenure." Henry Noble MacCracken, president of Vassar College, took on five people, a relatively large number given Vassar's small faculty. At the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), mathematician Oswald Veblen, as early as 1932, pressed for a rapid response to the refugee problem and organized a nationwide effort to bring mathematicians and physicists to safety, including Albert Einstein and Richard Courant. Veblen and the institute's first two directors, physician Abraham Flexner, a Hopkins graduate, and Frank Aydelotte, former president of Swarthmore, took eleven refugee scholars on at the IAS. While at Swarthmore, Aydelotte had employed five refugees, and his commitment to refugees led to his being named a member of the Emergency Committee's executive committee. It is from people such as these, and many others, including Sigerist, that we should set our moral compass.²²

* As measured by the duration of Emergency Committee grants, other universities were more generous than Johns Hopkins under Bowman. They retained an average of 30 percent of their grantees for more than two years, which is an underestimate of the duration of assistance because some grants ceased when the grantees were awarded tenure. At Johns Hopkins, none remained for more than two years and none was given tenure.

Philipppson and Breitscheid. To assist someone trapped in Europe was a weighty decision; it implicated life and death. Consider Alfred Philipppson, a geological geographer. He was the only Jewish geographer in all of Austria and Germany to hold the highest academic rank, Professor Ordinarius. There is little doubt that Bowman was aware of Philipppson's reputation. Although Philipppson retired in 1929, he continued to publish, including two books between 1936 and 1940.²³

In the spring of 1941, Philipppson and his family were under house arrest in Bonn. An international rescue effort commenced, led by Philipppson's family and his colleagues. One of the latter was Leo Waibel, who had held Philipppson's former chair at Bonn before taking a two-year position at Hopkins in 1939. Waibel pulled out all the stops to help the Philipppsons get out of Germany. Among those he contacted was Stephen Duggan at the Emergency Committee, who turned down the appeal on account of Philipppson's age. Nevertheless, Duggan immediately got in touch with Alvin Johnson on Philipppson's behalf, touting him as "a most unusual person." In turn, Johnson contacted Bowman to tell him about Philipppson.²⁴

Waibel was concerned that his own academic networks in the United States were thin, having been in the country for less than a year. One person he knew well was Bowman. Waibel made a direct appeal to Bowman to create a sinecure for Philipppson at Hopkins. But he came away pessimistic about receiving Bowman's support. In June he wrote to Philipppson's nephew, saying, "I briefed the most influential geographer in these lands, Dr. Bowman, President of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, but I don't expect any practical help from him."

That fall, the noose tightened. The Philipppsons were taken from their home. A group of European geographers launched a last-minute attempt to bring them to safety in Switzerland for which the Swiss government demanded monthly payments. Waibel held out hope that American geographers would pitch in to secure the needed funds. Karl Pelzer—who had been Waibel's student at Bonn and had left Germany for Berkeley in 1935 and in 1941 held a research position in the Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins—informed Waibel that "Bowman *may* [emphasis added] try to raise a part in Baltimore." Waibel sent the news to Philipppson's nephew, saying that if Bowman were to help it would be "of the greatest value." He noted, however, that Bowman had made no promise to do anything. As the clock ticked, Alvin Johnson warned Bowman that the Phillipson family faced impending deportation, "the worst thing that can happen to them." Waibel too said that "only prompt action can save the Philipppsons." Come March 1942, Bowman still had not acted, neither to raise funds nor to hire. The following month, the Germans sent the Philipppsons to Theresienstadt, a way station to extermination. (They survived.) Philipppson's biographer says that "Because [Bowman] was such a well-known and respected Professor, who had a lot of power and influence, he himself could have reacted differently and could have been an ideal to others."²⁵

At the very same time Philipppson was trying to escape, Bowman agreed to assist Rudolf Breitscheid, a member of Germany's Social Democratic Party's executive board. Breitscheid had written several books in the 1890s after which he became a political activist. He never held an academic post and the Emergency Committee in 1933 had turned down his request for a grant. In February 1941, the Germans arrested Breitscheid and imprisoned him in Gestapo headquarters in Berlin. That fall, Alvin Johnson again contacted Bowman, seeking assistance for Breitscheid. He

suggested that Bowman invite Breitscheid to Johns Hopkins to deliver lectures on German economic history but noted his “advanced age.” In late November Bowman sent an offer to Breitscheid along the lines suggested by Johnson, which was relayed to the Gestapo by the State Department. It arrived too late to save Breitscheid, who died in a concentration camp. There are a number of similarities between the Philippson and Breitscheid cases but also one notable difference: unlike Philippson, Breitscheid was not Jewish.

We know a bit about what happened behind the scenes in Berlin. After receiving Bowman’s letter, someone in the office of the Gestapo’s chief sent a memo to the Foreign Office requesting additional information about Bowman. Among other things, the official asked if Bowman was a Jew (perhaps because he associated the name Isaiah with Jews). The irony is that Bowman had on occasion confidentially approached people to ask if a person was Jewish. For instance, in 1943, when Bowman was seeking faculty to staff a new geography department, one of the candidates was the German-born geographer Henry J. Bruman, who had received his PhD in geography from Berkeley. Bowman asked his son Robert, who’d been a fellow graduate student of Bruman’s, whether Bruman was Jewish. “One of the new men [in the geography department] could be,” wrote Bowman to his son, “but I do not want two of them in the same department,” the same thing he’d said about Paul Friedländer. His son reassured him that Bruman was not a Jew, and Bowman went ahead and hired Bruman. Bowman did hire a Jew into the geography department, a brilliant French geographer and refugee named Jean Gottmann. Bowman turned around and dismissed Gottmann after less than four years, one of several outstanding scholars whom the university lost because of Bowman.²⁶

III. Faculty and Students at Johns Hopkins

Summary: At Johns Hopkins, Isaiah Bowman’s antisemitism reduced opportunities previously available to Jewish applicants, this at a time when peer institutions were moving in the opposite direction. His hostility to Jews caused a stunning loss of stellar Jewish and other faculty, and he repelled others. Worse was his behavior toward African American students, whom he blocked from the university. His views of African Americans were steeped in scientific racism. As a white supremacist, he sided with segregationist university presidents opposing government efforts to end discrimination in higher education. He also fired a faculty member who publicly criticized his racial policies.

Bowman became president of Johns Hopkins University in 1935. * He had a reputation as a competent administrator, based on the way he ran the AGS. But his reputation among scholars was shaky. To get a sense of how his contemporaries assessed Bowman we can turn to confidential evaluations made of him when he was under consideration to chair the National Research Council (NRC) in 1932. There were overlapping negative views provided by several of the referees, all prominent scientists. Douglas Johnson, a geologist at Columbia University, knew Bowman well, having worked with him on boundary maps in Paris. Bowman, he said, “enjoys the exercise of power . . .

* Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes report that when Johns Hopkins was seeking a new president, it was Frank B. Jewett, head of Bell Labs and a friend of Bowman’s, who was “instrumental in the trustees’ choice of Bowman.” It bears mention that Jewett was a well-known antisemite who refused to employ Jews at Bell Labs, a policy that did not change until after he stepped down in 1940.

Whether he would succeed in a position where persuasion rather than power is the prime requisite, and where leadership depends not on executive authority over subordinates but on tact and skill in stimulating equals to enthusiastic cooperation, seems to me problematical.” Another geologist, Nevin Fenneman, had similar views. Bowman might be successful in directing an organization made up of employees working under him, said Fenneman, but not one that consisted of academic researchers motivated by their love of the work more than the money. O.D. von Engeln, the Cornell geologist, said Bowman was a “martinet” and “a Mussolini type of man.”²⁷ *

Faculty. Not long after his appointment at Johns Hopkins, Bowman began firing well-regarded Jewish scholars, which discouraged others from staying at or moving to the university. What follows is a list of several of these people:

- James Franck. Franck was a brilliant physical chemist who won the 1925 Nobel Prize in Physics. He resigned his position at Göttingen in 1933 to protest the laws removing Jews from German universities. (He was Jewish.) Franck found his way to Denmark and shortly thereafter President Ames made him a tenured offer. Franck accepted, a phenomenal coup for the university. Franck was initially happy at Johns Hopkins. However, in 1938 he decamped for the University of Chicago. In an interview, Franck said that he left because “Bowman made life very difficult for Jewish faculty.” Even after Franck had made the decision to go, he was “astonished and humiliated” when Bowman told him that he “acted un-American in making the move.” Provost Edward Berry, at Bowman’s behest, sought to print a statement in the press accusing Franck of leaving “because it offered better financial arrangements,” a hint of the antisemitic canard that Jews were greedy. Although the statement was never published, Franck found out about it and demanded an apology, which never came.²⁸

- Eric F. Goldman. Eric Goldman, historian and public intellectual, was hired by the Johns Hopkins history department immediately upon receiving his PhD from the department in 1938. When the faculty voted unanimously in favor of reappointing Goldman, Bowman fired him. Bowman informed the history department that the reason for the dismissal was that “there are already too many Jews at Johns Hopkins.” Princeton immediately hired him. Charles Beard, the eminent historian, was on the Hopkins faculty at the time. After he heard that Bowman fired Goldman, he resigned in protest.²⁹

- Tracy Sonneborn. Sonneborn was a molecular biologist who obtained his doctorate from Johns Hopkins. After several years as a researcher at the university, he became an associate professor. His mentor, Herbert Spencer Jennings, planned to ease Sonneborn into the chairmanship that he was vacating. Sonneborn left Johns Hopkins after Bowman told him that he would never be allowed to head the department because he would be subject to “irresistible pressures” to hire other Jews, which

* Several of the experts who vetted Bowman had low opinions of his scientific acumen. One said his expertise was in “social problems” not in chemistry or physics, another that his “direct interest in the sciences is very small,” and a third noted his lack of “scientific eminence” and inability to judge trends of scientific investigation. He also questioned geography’s scientific status.

would cause non-Jews to leave. Bowman went so far as to say that hiring Sonneborn would “ruin the department.” Sonneborn took a position at Indiana University.³⁰

- Richard Hofstadter. Hofstadter was one of the greatest US historians of the century. In 1946, when Hofstadter was at the University of Maryland, the history department at Johns Hopkins considered hiring him. The department ultimately decided not to make an offer because “there was fear in the department that Bowman might make difficulty when he found out that Hofstadter was half Jewish.” Hofstadter went to Columbia and would twice receive the Pulitzer Prize.³¹

- Simon Kuznets. Kuznets, an economist, was 21 when his parents emigrated from Russia to the United States. In 1947, the Department of Political Economy at Hopkins unanimously recommended that the university appoint Kuznets, who then was a full professor at Penn. The Kuznets hire looked like a sure thing; Penn had already selected his replacement. Bowman asked someone if Kuznets was, “you know, a Jewy Jew” and then killed the appointment by offering a salary much lower than had previously been promised. Kuznets later said that Bowman’s offer had been the only obstacle to moving. Several years after Bowman passed away, a new and better offer was made. Kuznets went to Johns Hopkins and six years later to Harvard. In 1971, he was one of the first to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics.³²

- George Rosen. Rosen was a physician, public health expert, and medical historian. He was a student and protégé of Henry Sigerist, who hoped that Rosen would take a position at the Institute of the History of Medicine. Erwin Ackernecht—a refugee and professor at the University of Wisconsin who for five years had been a researcher at the institute—warned Rosen that because he was Jewish, his appointment was highly unlikely under Bowman. Rather than suffer a slight, Rosen went to Columbia and later to Yale.

The harm caused to Johns Hopkins by Bowman was considerable. Within a decade the university lost a Nobel Prize winner, a future Nobelist (later hired), two eminent scientists, three of the era’s finest historians, and others. His antisemitism ran so deep that he willingly risked the university’s stature. Bowman left one of the worst legacies of any president of a leading research university. James Franck summed it up when he said that Bowman was “anti-intellectual, anti-everything.”³³ *

Jewish Students. Until Bowman, there had never been a quota for Jewish undergraduates, which made Hopkins different from other top private universities. ** Many of the Jewish students had come from Baltimore’s affluent German Jewish community, some of whom were donors to the university. In 1935, the year Bowman came onboard, Jewish students accounted for 18 percent of undergraduates. Bowman cut that figure by nearly half in 1942, when he created a secret quota set at a 10 percent maximum. Keeping the quota a secret was an attempt to avoid criticism, including from

* Bowman’s antisemitism and imperious approach to faculty affairs caused several non-Jewish faculty to leave. In addition to Charles Beard, they included the eminent philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy, the psychologist and former president of the American Psychological Association Knight Dunlap, and literary historian Gilbert Chinard.

** In 1918-1919, Hopkins was near the top of the list of elite schools in the proportion of Jewish undergraduates. At 16 percent it was behind Columbia (21 percent) and Chicago (18 percent) but above Penn (15 percent), Harvard (10 percent), Cornell (9 percent), and Brown, Dartmouth, and Princeton (3 percent or less).

donors. But there were students, faculty, and local Jews who knew of the quota's existence if possibly not the precise figure.³⁴

Bowman's determination to reverse course stemmed from his belief that Hopkins was "becoming a practically Jewish organization." A year after instituting the quota, he said privately that "Jews don't come to Hopkins to make the world better or anything like that. They come for two things: to make money and to marry non-Jewish women." The money-making charge was the same leveled against James Franck—Jews were crassly avaricious—while the remark about non-Jewish women carried a whiff of uglier sentiments.³⁵ *

Despite what was happening at Johns Hopkins, legal and social norms regarding race were in flux during and after the war. Although inadequate, President Roosevelt issued a historic order in 1941 to end discrimination against defense workers on the basis of race, creed, color, or nationality. That year a Fair Employment Practices Commission was created to monitor discrimination against African Americans by defense contractors. In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal turned the spotlight on the nation's race relations in his influential study *An American Dilemma*. Meanwhile, the NAACP and others fought in the courts to end the many forms that segregation took.

For African Americans, however, the gap between principles and practices was wide. The return of over a million Black veterans who had fought for freedom only to experience prejudice at home fueled demands for more robust efforts. In 1946 President Harry Truman created a commission to address racial biases in higher education. Racially separate but unequally funded colleges were scrutinized, as were discriminatory admissions practices aimed at Jewish students.

Several presidents of Ivy League schools saw the handwriting on the wall and began to raise their Jewish quotas. One was James B. Conant at Harvard University. As a faculty member during the 1920s, Conant had supported discriminatory admissions practices. But during and after the war, he favored the admission of a greater number of Catholics and Jews. Conant is credited by Seymour Martin Lipset and David Riesman, the latter a Harvard faculty member, with introducing "a new emphasis on pure achievement [and] meritocracy." He had sympathy for the "meatballs"—"ambitious, lower-middle-class local students [and] the first- and second-generation ethnic immigrants." Bowman led Johns Hopkins in the opposite direction, causing apprehension within the Baltimore region's Jewish community, which knew that Jewish admissions had declined.³⁶ **

* Bowman's quip was also tasteless, coming eight years after the Nuremberg laws barring intermarriage between Jews and those of German blood.

** Lipset and Riesman report that in 1952, when Johns Hopkins still had an undergraduate Jewish quota of 10 percent, the proportion of Jewish students in a sample of elite private institutions was 25 percent at Harvard, up from 17 percent in 1935, followed by Cornell (23 percent), Dartmouth (15 percent), Yale (13 percent), and Wesleyan (12 percent).

To reassure local Jews, G. Wilson Shaffer, the dean of undergraduates, met with the director of the Baltimore Jewish Council, Leon Sachs. Sachs knew the university well, having been an instructor in its Department of Political Science during the 1930s. (Arthur Hertzberg, the rabbi and scholar, said that Sachs' departure from the university was the result of Bowman's antipathy to Jews.) In his meeting with Sachs, Shaffer denied the charge that he was antisemitic and said that the university did not have and never had a quota. To this Sachs replied, "We know what you mean, Wilson. You're not against Jews. You just don't want kikes from New Jersey." In 1948, Bowman deceived a Jewish philanthropist and prospective donor, assuring him that the university did not have a quota. He told the same lie to a representative of the Anti-Defamation League.*

Under Bowman, the Jewish quota was entwined with other policies that had the effect of limiting the number of Jews. Because Jewish students viewed the university as a steppingstone to the professions, they disproportionately applied to the premed and engineering programs instead of to the humanities. Bowman sought to reduce the number of students in the sciences. Allegedly it was done to improve the quality of the undergraduate program, although it had the effect of depressing the number of Jewish admits. The university instituted new admissions criteria such as geographic diversity that also made it easier to limit Jewish admits, who largely came from urban areas in the northeast. Another change was to restrict the number of scholarships awarded to Jewish admittees. To implement and administer these policies, Bowman hired an admissions director from Princeton, a university at the bottom of the Ivies in its proportion of Jewish students. Quotas were only one part of Bowman's strategy to reshape the university into a less "Jewish organization."³⁷

Within the university, one person who stood up to Bowman was William Foxwell Albright, a prominent Biblical scholar and archaeologist. He was an advocate for civil rights and a person with ethical commitments. In 1944, Albright gave a talk at Columbia University in which he said, "Minorities function as a touchstone of democracy. How a nation treats its minorities is indicative to the world of the kind of society it is." A year later Albright was contacted by one of his former postdoctoral students, Harry Orlinsky, then about to become a full professor at Hebrew Union College in New York, one of three seminaries run by the Reform Judaism movement. Orlinsky sought Albright's help after he learned that the university had put a quota in place and was turning away highly qualified Jewish applicants. He received the information from a graduate student then studying in the university's history department, Ellis Rivkin, who would go on to become a professor at another Hebrew Union College, this one in Cincinnati. Rivkin had spoken to other students to corroborate rumors of the quota's existence. One of them had learned that a university committee had approved the quota and that Shaffer told others about it. Albright complained not only to Bowman but also to colleagues, administrators, and the trustees. His stature gave him protection from retaliation by Bowman but his efforts were to no avail.³⁸

* Bowman's relationships with prominent Jews frequently were opportunistic. He sought donations from Baltimore's German Jews but privately made antisemitic quips about Jews and money. He knew the quota would reduce opportunities for their children. Bowman, an anti-Zionist, had ties to and sought funds from several wealthy Jewish anti-Zionists, such as Jacob Blaustein and Charles J. Liebman (below).

After Bowman retired, his policies continued to cast a shadow. Arthur Sarnoff, a graduate of the Class of 1953 who later served as a Hopkins trustee, recalled in his oral history that he'd been part of a group of Jewish students who went to see Shaffer to complain about the quota. By then it was no secret. To Shaffer they said, "We want to know why there were 416 or 417 [in our class], and we only got 41. Why didn't we get the other 7/10th of a percent?" Sarnoff reported that the dean said to them, "We have absolutely no Jewish quota." At that point, says Sarnoff, "We turned our backs and walked out of the office." In the early 1950s the university's admissions office dropped questions about an applicant's religious affiliation. The changes began after the scion of a wealthy Baltimore Jewish family refused an invitation to join the board of trustees unless Hopkins rid itself of the quota.³⁹

African American Students. Jewish students, despite the barriers they faced, at least had the opportunity to attend Hopkins, something denied to African Americans. Bowman was a staunch segregationist. Other universities comparable to Hopkins modestly increased their number of African American undergraduates during and following the war. At Harvard, for example, 37 African Americans matriculated as undergraduates between 1939 and 1949. The first African American undergraduate to receive a Johns Hopkins degree was Frederick Scott, who was admitted in 1945 and graduated in 1950 with a degree in chemical engineering. It does not appear that any other African Americans were enrolled as undergraduates until after Bowman's resignation.⁴⁰

The situation was similarly egregious for African Americans applying to the university's graduate programs. B. M. Rhetta, a local African American physician who headed Baltimore's Interracial Commission, had been applying unsuccessfully to the School of Public Health since the 1920s. Rhetta's hopes were raised in the late 1930s by recent admissions of African Americans to public health schools at Harvard and Michigan. In a letter to Bowman, Dr. Rhetta applied yet again in 1938 and was rejected as before.⁴¹

Edward S. Lewis also applied in 1938, seeking to enter the university's doctoral program in economics (then called political economy). Lewis had an MA from Penn's economics department and had recently become president of Baltimore's Urban League. The application put Bowman in a quandary. Accepting a Black applicant was unthinkable to him; a rejection would bring unwanted negative publicity. A key fact in the case was that the economics department had accepted Lewis's credits from Penn and judged his application "more than satisfactory" for admission.

For nearly two years, the issue languished in the Academic Council, the arbiter of the Lewis case. The council stalled because it was "well aware that it would not be under Bowman that Hopkins opened its classrooms to African American students" and did not wish to go against him. Shortly before the council decided to refuse admission to Lewis, Bowman met with him privately. He asked Lewis to withdraw his application and sit in on courses, which Lewis refused to do.

There was an uproar after the Academic Council's unanimous rejection in November 1939. The *Baltimore Afro-American* newspaper said that in the past, the university's administration had been forthright in saying that "colored students" could not be admitted simply because of their race. In the Lewis case, said the newspaper, Bowman tried to hide his racial motives by publicly implying that the rejection was not on account of race. Bowman was "trying to get out of a hole," said the newspaper,

and in reaction to his claim that race was not an issue, it printed a headline in large font saying, “We Still Don’t Believe Him.” Another headline said, “Why Not Hopkins?” Broadus Mitchell, an outspoken professor in the economics department, scathingly criticized the rejection: “We damn the German universities for excluding the Jews, but we, in this moment of exaltation of democracy, do just exactly the same things to the Negroes.” Closer to home, none other than Bowman’s son, Robert (then a graduate student at Berkeley), pleaded with his father to admit Lewis. Bowman remained obdurate, telling his son, “There is no need for such admission in view of the existence of Morgan College for Negroes.” It was the same “separate but equal” doctrine embraced by Jim Crow states, though equality did not exist.

Bowman took no responsibility for his decision. Instead, he blamed Broadus Mitchell’s public statements, which, he said, made it difficult for the university to accept Lewis lest it appear that it was bowing to outside pressure rather than deciding based on the merits of the case (this despite the favorable decision of the economics faculty). He also took potshots at Lewis, whom he called “a troublemaker in this town.” The greater problem, said Bowman on another occasion, was that Negroes who applied to graduate school had “insufficient preparation or other deficiencies that would make it impossible for them to do the work required for an advanced degree.” The year after Lewis’s denial, Bowman ordered a professor in the English department to respond to a graduate application from a “Negress” by admitting her to avoid further controversy. Next, Bowman instructed the professor to tell her that she would be happier elsewhere and if she didn’t have “the goods . . . her race won’t entitle her to special consideration and she’ll be thrown out.” *

Included in Bowman’s file on the Lewis case is an odd letter sent to him in May 1939 by Princeton economist Harold Hutcheson. Hutcheson was answering questions Bowman had put to him about the legal interpretation of racial intermarriage in several southern states with anti-miscegenation laws. Hutcheson told Bowman that in those states such marriages were felonious and would render the marriage void. One can only speculate as to why Bowman had miscegenation on his mind at the peak of the Lewis controversy.

Besides Broadus Mitchell, Bowman also went after another civil rights advocate: Betty Pelzer, an anthropologist and the wife of Karl Pelzer. At Bowman’s behest, she’d been hired as a part-time researcher on a refugee settlement project overseen by Bowman. In 1947, Betty Pelzer published a series of articles in the *Baltimore Sun* “decrying the unequal social treatment of ‘Negroes’ at Johns Hopkins and calling for an end to the ‘color line.’” Bowman was infuriated. He retaliated by firing Betty’s husband, Karl Pelzer, who by then was teaching in the new geography department. Pelzer spent the next thirty years at Yale, where he directed its program in Southeast Asia Studies—another star lost.⁴²

* Edward Lewis went on to serve for thirty years as the president of the Greater New York Urban League, during which time he received a PhD from New York University. The same year as the Lewis debacle, Teddy Roosevelt’s son proposed an AGS award to Matthew Hensen, the African American explorer who co-discovered the North Pole with Robert Peary, the latter one of Bowman’s heroes. Bowman, still influential at the AGS, was against the idea, complaining of attempts by the “large movement of Negroes to get a place in the sun.”

Scientific Racism. The eugenic ideas that Bowman championed in the 1920s continued to guide his thinking after he became university president, now against the background of the Nazi regime. When writing to his son, Bowman was free to express his innermost feelings. A letter he sent in 1946 contained powerful racist stereotypes:

In 1907 when I first went to the Caribbean and Panama it was common talk that if you engaged a colored man to work he lasted for only the few days required to earn \$5.00. With that sum he could sit in the shade and eat rice and dried fish and beans for a week without doing anything. It is not insecurity and low income that makes for low morale. It is a combination which also includes a great desire to sit in the shade. When Della [his housekeeper] was sick this past winter I fed her \$5.00 worth of vitamins and she picked up right away and was as well as ever in a month but she still insists on sitting in the shade for about three hours while I work to supply the living of herself and two other loafers . . . A person who receives unemployment pay of \$20 a week has no taxes to pay, no social security payments to make . . . We pay \$25 a week to each of our three servants. They know if they stop working they would be just as well off and so they work as little as they please.

Bowman's assertion that "colored people" were as likely to "sit in the shade" in 1946 as in 1905, whether in Baltimore or Panama, was an instance of scientific racism. Elsewhere in the letter Bowman wrote, "It's in the blood!" Unlike other eugenicists, Bowman was too politic to publicly endorse sterilization of those with allegedly inherited traits such as indolence, criminality, and promiscuity. Almost always the targets were nonwhite. However, he came close in an article published on the eve of America's entry into the Second World War. There he pronounced, "Our civilization will decline unless we improve our human breed. To support the genetically unfit and also allow them to breed is to degrade our society."⁴³

In two other articles written at this time, Bowman expressed similar concerns that the US had developed "dysgenic rather than eugenic qualities." He lamented the shrinkage of the nation's WASP elite as compared to lesser groups. Bowman praised New England's settlers and their descendants, who, he said, had a "pervasive influence . . . upon American intellectual and material development." The problem was that their "unusual intellectual and other social capacities have become linked with diminished fertility. The well-endowed are not reproducing on an adequate scale . . . it means continued erosion of human character and loss to the race and to civilization."⁴⁴

Attacks on scientific racism mounted after the First World War, targeting its assumptions and methodology. An early critic was Raymond Pearl, a renowned biostatistician in the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. Although Pearl had once espoused eugenic racial ideas, now he distanced himself from them. In 1927, he published an article attacking the "biology of superiority." Eugenics, he said, had "largely become . . . full of emotional appeals to class and race prejudices, solemnly put forth as science, and unfortunately accepted as such by the general public."⁴⁵

Criticisms such as Pearl's entered public discourse after the Nazis took power. Julian Huxley, the biologist, was another scholar who now recanted his previous eugenicism and condemned its claims. In 1935 he coauthored a book puncturing eugenic assertions by Nazi officials and scientists in Germany. Science must refuse, they wrote, "to lend her sanction to the absurdities and horrors perpetrated in her name. Racialism is a myth and a dangerous one at that." Anthropologist Franz Boas mobilized the

scientific community against the pseudoscience that lay behind Nazi racial ideology. In 1938, he persuaded the American Anthropological Association to pass a resolution denying racial significance to terms like “Aryan” and “Semite.”

Bowman never let go of his toxic beliefs, despite their touchpoints with Nazi racial “science.” Even the Holocaust, which Daniel J. Kevles says “all but buried the eugenic ideal,” failed to change Bowman’s views. By the summer of 1943, if not earlier, he knew of mass murders. In his capacity as a high-level advisor to the State Department, Bowman received a confidential eyewitness report describing the procedures being used to gas thousands of Jews at Belzec, including ghastly photographs. Yet knowledge of these facts did nothing to temper his antisemitism and other racial views.⁴⁶

The GI Bill provided tuition and living expenses to returning veterans. But African Americans, Jews, and other groups found themselves up against persistent discrimination in higher education. In 1947, a commission organized by President Harry Truman—known as the Truman Commission—issued a report on higher education that included a section on “equalizing and expanding individual opportunity.” (The report’s publication coincided with the publication of another commission’s report on civil rights in other spheres.) The Truman Commission recommended an end to the segregation of Black university students into underfunded colleges. Another section dealt with discrimination against Jews and called for an end to biased admissions practices.⁴⁷ *

The commission members included two distinguished African American educators—Lewis W. Jones, president of Fisk University and F. D. Patterson from Tuskegee. There were also two prominent Jews—Horace Kallen, who taught at the New School, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Another commission member was Milton S. Eisenhower, president of Kansas State University and brother of the general.

After the report’s release a group of nine university presidents condemned it, as reported in the press. Seven came from public and private schools in the south—Arkansas, Emory, Mississippi, Rollins College, Texas, Tulane, and Vanderbilt—and an eighth was St. Louis University, a Catholic institution.** The ninth was Johns Hopkins. Southern public universities were under the thumb of state legislatures that threatened a withdrawal of funds were they to admit Black students. Colgate W. Darden, Jr., president of the University of Virginia, a public university, said that abolishing segregation was simply not possible politically. Johns Hopkins, a private university, faced a different problem. The wartime and postwar explosion of federal spending on research, of which Hopkins was a major beneficiary, made the university vulnerable to any future federal efforts to end segregation. The Truman Commission was a harbinger. Yet Bowman refused to bend, once again allowing his prejudices to put the university at risk.***

* The Truman Commission’s full name was the President’s Commission on Higher Education.

** Some Catholic universities feared that the report might lead to restraints on their admissions practices and access to public funds.

*** Despite his state’s strictures on segregation of public universities, Frank P. Graham, president of the University of North Carolina, sought to change the situation as best he could. In 1933, five years before the Lewis case, Graham criticized the state’s ban on African American students in a case involving the admission of a

Lumping Johns Hopkins together with less distinguished schools raised another problem. It undermined the university's claim that its reference group was an elite consisting of Berkeley, Chicago, MIT, and the Ivy League. What made Bowman different from most if not all of his elite peers was the lifelong centrality of race in his ideas and actions. His was not a genteel sort of prejudice; it was embedded in deeply-held ideas such as scientific racism. To paraphrase William Foxwell Albright, how Bowman treated African Americans was indicative of the type of man he was.⁴⁸

The trustees of Johns Hopkins repudiated the Bowman era when they selected Milton Eisenhower as university president in 1956. As president of Kansas State, Eisenhower curbed racial discrimination in athletics at Kansas State and in intercollegiate sports more widely. He was chairman of the US National Commission for UNESCO in 1950, the same year the agency issued a landmark study challenging the assertion that science supported claims of a racial hierarchy. (The *New York Times* announced the publication with the headline, "No Scientific Basis for Race Bias Found by World Panel of Experts.") After arriving at Johns Hopkins, Eisenhower increased the number of African American students, warned local landlords to cease discriminating against them (and Jews), and took other steps to reverse the course set by Bowman. One of the most important was the hiring of the university's first African American tenure-track professor Earl H. Nash, Jr., who in 1961 became an assistant professor of medical psychology in the School of Medicine. Nash published over twenty papers before an untimely death in 1966.⁴⁹

IV. Refugees and Bowman's Government Service

Summary: As an advisor on refugees to President Roosevelt and the State Department, Bowman undermined, stalled, and blocked the rescue of Europeans trying to escape the Nazis, most of them Jews. He minimized settlement possibilities in Latin America for fear that Jewish refugees might go from there to the United States. He was not the only one responsible for the refugee disaster, although his failings were considerable. Historians regard him as the State Department's worst antisemite.

Roosevelt's Advisor. There's disagreement about the adequacy of President Roosevelt's response to the refugee crisis. The debate centers on barriers to entry to the United States. Roosevelt's sympathizers note that at home the president faced a difficult political situation that tied his hands, including opposition to immigration from the public, the State Department, and southern Democrats whose legislative support he needed. The State Department's consular offices refused to fill European quotas in most years during the 1930s. Critics say that despite these constraints, the president had some leeway to act but failed to do so. Roosevelt was cautious to a fault and offloaded the refugee problem on other countries. He promoted this approach at the Évian conference he convened in 1938,

qualified student to UNC's pharmacy program. Graham also challenged his own university's medical school over its quota on Jewish admittees. In 1936, the year Bowman accepted his award from the *Verein*, Graham announced that the US should not participate in the Berlin Olympics if German Jewish athletes were barred. Not surprisingly, Graham was regularly attacked by North Carolina's politicians and press. The point of all this is that Graham—a public university president who faced legal restrictions that Bowman did not—nonetheless took stands against racial discrimination and antisemitism.

where 32 countries were represented, nearly all of whom were reluctant to bear the burden that America refused to carry. Nevertheless, the president subsequently pushed visa reforms to save lives.

After writing *The New World*, Bowman became interested in settlement opportunities for white migrants to the world's hinterlands. Bowman's book on the subject, *The Pioneer Fringe* (1931), was an implicit challenge to Frederick Jackson Turner's claim that the frontier had disappeared in the United States. (Bowman oversimplified Turner's ideas.) Bowman identified a number of habitable places to be found on marginal but developable lands with decent soil, transport, and climates suitable for white people. Bowman idealized settlers as hard-working pioneers who sought the independence provided by self-sufficiency. The book noted that Latin America was one of the places with suitable settlement zones of varying size—in Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and a region overlapping Argentina and Paraguay. Bowman also mentioned Mennonite colonies in Latin America that were established in the late nineteenth century.

Two years after publication of *The Pioneer Fringe*, a Jewish exodus began. Over 250,000 Jews left Germany and Poland between 1933 and 1935, and there were additional thousands from other countries. In 1937, Bowman edited an anthology on settlement in which he struck a different and more pessimistic tone than before, as reflected in the title he chose, *The Limits of Land Settlement*. Although he said that the volume was intended to address the world's overpopulation problem, in the background was Jews on the move. Bowman wrote the chapter on South America, which was his academic specialty. Now he said that settlement opportunities could be found almost nowhere on the continent, and that the habitable places—all rural—could support only a few. The about-face on hemispheric settlement reflected his concern that migrating refugees would use nearby Latin America as a steppingstone for emigration to the United States.⁵⁰ *

In October 1938, President Roosevelt turned to Bowman for advice on finding places to settle refugees from the Nazis. He named Bowman his "special advisor" on refugees. Bowman was not a surprising choice given his acquaintance with Roosevelt, who was an AGS member for nearly twenty years, and because of Bowman's familiarity with Latin America, a place the president believed had extensive land suitable for refugee settlement. But from the very beginning Bowman's advice to Roosevelt was consistently negative about opportunities in Latin America.

An area of early interest to the president was the Orinoco region of Venezuela, where Roosevelt believed there were good prospects for settlement. He knew that Jewish refugee organizations were then negotiating with the Venezuelan government over admission of refugees. Roosevelt informed the US Ambassador to Venezuela that the country might have extensive areas suitable for refugees. Five months later, after Bowman became his special advisor, Roosevelt asked for his thoughts on the Orinoco. Bowman said that ticks and tropical conditions made it uninhabitable by

* In contrast to Bowman, the eminent Berkeley geographer Carl O. Sauer wrote in *Limits of Land Settlement* that there was still a great deal of room in Latin America for the settlement of trained professionals and artisans, the type of Jews who fled to Latin American cities. But, he added, "they will not be colonists," which was the only option Bowman ever considered.

white Europeans. The president noticed that Bowman had ignored areas at higher elevations and pressed Bowman about them. Bowman nixed those prospects as well.

Bowman subsequently expanded the geographic scope of his nay-saying about Latin America and told the president that all of “Northern South America offers no place for colonization, on a large scale, of people such as we have in mind.” He said that the lowland tropics were inhospitable for white Europeans, and at higher elevations they would experience increased pulmonary and heart disease. Roosevelt then pressed Bowman about possibilities in Central America, specifically Costa Rica. Initially Bowman told the president that Costa Rica might be promising, although a few days later he backed away from the idea, saying there would be “political difficulties which a large immigrant group would create.” *

Bowman finally advised Roosevelt to avoid Latin America entirely. His justification placed immigrant exclusion above responsiveness to endangered lives:

My own feeling is that we keep our position uncompromised in the Western Hemisphere only so long as we do not interest ourselves directly in the importation of European population elements. The moment we do so we are likely to be charged with importation of an [sic] European quarrel into America. Even if we are right about such importation from the humanitarian standpoint, we thereby give the other fellow a chance to claim that we are wrong.

What lay behind this statement was revealed in a later passage that asked, “Why not keep the European elements within the framework of the Old World? . . . The consequences of [rescuing refugees] will surely involve us in the rightness or wrongness of acts of the governments of the states of Central Europe.” Consider what Bowman was saying: the president should take a hands-off approach to the refugee crisis so as to keep Jews out of the United States.⁵¹

Following *Kristallnacht*, Roosevelt proposed a plan that would transfer one hundred thousand refugees annually to overseas places. Roosevelt’s vision was capacious. He’s been described as “an early convert to what he called the ‘big idea.’” Sumner Welles, a friend of Roosevelt’s and Undersecretary of State, favored an idea promoted by Bernard Baruch to establish a protectorate in Angola where millions might be resettled. Roosevelt was keen on the plan. So was Bowman, who hoped that it would prevent Jews from going to Palestine.** The rest of Africa was out of the question,

* Another place Bowman drubbed was British Guiana. The President’s Advisory Commission on Political Refugees (PACPR), headed by the aforementioned James G. McDonald, thought the British colony was suitable for refugees. In 1939 PACPR asked Bowman for a preliminary report. Predictably Bowman said that British Guiana was uninhabitable because of tropical disease and transportation problems. PACPR ignored Bowman and turned for advice to Serge Korff, a physicist familiar with Latin America. Korff said that British Guiana had potential, at which point PACPR created a survey committee. It reported that good land and natural resources outweighed other problems. It recommended an initial site that could support three to five thousand refugees. The British promised infrastructural assistance but backed out when they went to war.

** Bowman was a passionate anti-Zionist. He made concerted efforts to stop Roosevelt from endorsing Palestine as a refugee destination, including personal overtures to the president’s spouse, Eleanor Roosevelt. Bowman argued that if Jewish refugees established a homeland in Palestine, it would lead to violence between Arabs and

however. The African tropics, Bowman said, would produce “nervous strain” among European settlers and it was possible that white children born there could not “maintain the vigor of the stock.” In any event, the British opposed the Angola plan and it died quickly after Britain entered the war.

Not long after the 1939 invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt gave a speech in Washington warning that at the war’s end, an anticipated 10 to 20 million displaced persons would need homes. A more urgent problem was the immediate rescue of “two or three hundred thousand refugees who are in dire need and who must as quickly as possible be given opportunity to settle in other countries.” Privately Bowman ridiculed the president’s speech, saying that “everyone seemed to me to be rushing around in circles, wringing their hands, talking nonsense . . . and asking, ‘Why doesn’t someone do something?’ [Yet] it is better to be slow than to be foolish.”

The following month Bowman met with Paul van Zeeland. He was the former prime minister of Belgium and head of the Jewish-financed Coordination Foundation, created in 1939 by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Van Zeeland explained his organization’s emergency rescue ideas and begged Bowman to take immediate action. He told him, “We should now have settlement and not talk” and asked him to make every effort to secure needed action. When van Zeeland asked Bowman to convey his sentiments to Roosevelt, Bowman declined, saying that the busy president should not be pressured. Shortly thereafter, van Zeeland met with Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who immediately sent a memo to Roosevelt about van Zeeland’s plans, to which the president gave a detailed reply. It’s unclear why Bowman refused to contact Roosevelt about van Zeeland’s plan, even though he had direct access to the president.⁵²

Van Zeeland was anxious because the refugee situation had become calamitous that year. Throughout 1939, the *New York Times* published articles reporting that German and Polish Jews were being starved and beaten, even committing mass suicide. That fall the British published a White Paper on conditions in concentration camps within Germany’s borders, which by then numbered over a dozen. The *Times* story ran under a long and chilling headline: “Nazi Tortures Detailed by Britain; Concentration Camp Horrors Told: White Paper Says Practices Recall ‘Darkest Ages’ - Diplomats’ Reports Give Data on Floggings and Killings by Guards.” The article appeared three weeks before van Zeeland pleaded with Bowman to hurry up.⁵³

Bowman instructed the president that rescue could occur only by transferring small groups of Jewish refugees to agricultural colonies scattered globally, a policy that foreclosed Roosevelt’s “big idea” for settling hundreds of thousands. Said Bowman,

The refugee problem must be solved by settlement planning on a world scale with absorption of settlers in limited numbers here, there, and elsewhere, and everywhere, so as to produce no shock to the economic structure of the receiving country. Put in another way, the absorption must be on such a

Jews. The claim was prescient but came wrapped with antisemitic sentiments. The president initially agreed with Bowman but in 1944, an election year, he “broke training,” as Bowman put it, and endorsed sending Jewish refugees to Palestine. Bowman called Roosevelt a coward for doing this.

limited scale in any one area that the people already established in the area will welcome the new settlers.

Roosevelt told Winston Churchill that “Bowman’s plan essentially is to spread the Jews thin all over the world.” Bowman’s advice to Roosevelt prioritized the attitudes of the resident population—an uncertain prediction—over the prospect of saving lives—a certainty. It also curbed the number of people who could be helped. And it was impractical. According to historians Richard Breitman and Allan Lichtman, Bowman’s approach “represented a dead end for refugees, given the difficulty of managing all of its moving parts.” There was yet another problem that Bowman never mentioned. Few of the refugees knew how to farm. But this was of little importance because Bowman never created a plan or even an outline for refugee resettlement.⁵⁴

In 1939 Bowman turned to the Rockefeller Foundation for support in organizing a research project on settlement. It would have two purposes: to supply the president with information and to produce studies that Bowman could use for his own future research on the “science of settlement.” Urgency was subordinated to the painstakingly slow collection of facts. Said Bowman:

The whole enterprise [of refugee settlement] ought to be conceived not as an emergency measure for population in flight but as a broad scientific undertaking If the procedures are orderly and the plans wisely drawn to that population and resources are given a linkage that is rational, there is no reason to expect opposition.

The Rockefeller Foundation rejected Bowman’s request but he obtained a sizable grant from the Refugee Economic Corporation (REC), headed by a Jewish philanthropist and anti-Zionist, Charles J. Liebman, who wanted to aid refugees but shunt them away from Palestine. With generous aid from Liebman, Bowman created a research unit in the Page School that published dozens of reports over the next several years. Bowman was in charge. He set the framework for the reports and hired the authors, most of them geographers he knew, including from the university. Another researcher was his son Robert, also a geographer, who was sent by the REC to study Australia and New Zealand. Administration was handled by Owen Lattimore, the China scholar and director of the Page School. Lattimore later recalled that it was within the context of the REC project that he came to realize that “Bowman was *profoundly* anti-Semitic.” On a different occasion, Lattimore said the “horribleness” of Bowman’s antisemitism almost caused him to give up his professorship at the university.

The REC reports were descriptive case studies that evaluated dozens of places on their suitability for agricultural colonies. Not a word was said about urban regions, in part because of Bowman’s belief that emigration to the US from cities was easier than from rural areas. However, Bowman recognized that rural colonies posed a risk, albeit on a smaller scale, because “the best men are constantly looking around for escape to the cities and particularly to the US.” *

* Obtaining a visa while living in the countryside was more difficult than for those residing in cities. The consulates that issued visas—a procedure that required frequent visits—were in far-away cities, as were persons who could provide legal advice.

There was another factor, one which Bowman never expressed publicly: that sending Jewish refugees to the hinterlands would prevent them from amassing economic power at the expense of white natives. One year into the war he wrote to his son about his opposition to settling Jewish refugees in Australia. “In Australia the economic organization is already completed . . . the danger lies in Jewish control of that organization if too many are allowed into the country and particularly the cities.” This was a different twist on Bowman’s obsession with Jews and money—the antisemitic smear that Jews seek economic domination of nations and the world.⁵⁵ *

Despite Bowman’s claims that Latin America could never support more than a handful of settlers, somewhere between 75,000 and 128,000 Jewish refugees made their way there after 1933. Nearly all went to cities. Consider Bolivia, where Bowman said that there was only one “isolated place” where settlement was feasible. Yet twenty thousand Jewish refugees escaped to Bolivia after 1933. The majority settled in La Paz (elevation 12,000 feet) and the rest in Cochabamba. With aid from relief agencies, they built communal institutions and reestablished themselves as merchants, professionals, and other nonmanual occupations. Brazil was officially closed to Jews, although a conservative estimate is that twelve to fifteen thousand refugees went there. ** Colombia, which Bowman had told Roosevelt was unacceptable, took in four thousand Jewish refugees. Argentina followed the pattern. Bowman savaged a report by a fellow geographer that informed the REC that vacant land in Argentina was available for a large number of agricultural settlements. Bowman offered a litany of reasons why the area was unsuitable for farming: There was coarse grass, great heat and humidity, and experienced prolonged droughts followed by heavy rains. The difficulties, he concluded, were “extraordinary.” Yet after 1933, Argentina received forty-three to fifty thousand Jewish refugees—more per capita than any place in the world except Palestine.⁵⁶

In the end, only a few refugees settled in Latin American farming colonies. The largest was at Sosúa in the Dominican Republic. Bowman had no direct role in its creation, although he favored the place because, he said, it offered few “possibilities of drifting to urban communities.” But he was mistaken. *Sosúa* saw its population peak at five hundred. By 1944 well more than half had departed for nearby towns.⁵⁷

* Bowman’s son asked his father, why make a fuss about Jews moving to Australia given the deleterious effect that Spain’s expulsion of Jews had on its economy? His father replied, “To say that from Spain’s standpoint it was unfortunate to expel Jews in the 15th century is quite a different thing from saying that it would be desirable to invite them into any other given country.” In ink, Bowman marked the passage “confidential of course.” Bowman’s earliest remarks about Jewish economic power appeared in *The New World* in a discussion of Hungary. In Hungarian towns, he wrote, Jews “as merchants and bankers [have] eventually dominated the peasantry as well as artisan classes.” In another passage he blamed Hungary’s “plexus of evils” on its system of land tenure and the “strangle hold upon the peasant . . . of the commercial system of the town, managed by powerful merchants, mainly Jews.” That Jews wielded vast economic clout and habitually sought more of it was an antisemitic trope then popular in speeches by Father Coughlin and Nazi leaders, and in the notorious publication promoted by Henry Ford, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

** In 1940 Bowman was told by a Ford Motor executive that Henry Ford—perhaps wishing to cleanse his antisemitic reputation—wanted to employ refugees on the company’s giant rubber plantations in Brazil, an offer that Bowman did not follow up on.

There were proposals circulating at the time to build emergency refugee camps in places other than Latin America, as with van Zeeland's plan. In late 1938, Frank Aydelotte and others devised a plan to settle on the Isle of Man one hundred thousand refugees stuck in Germany. In January 1939, Karl Pelzer informed Bowman about Aydelotte's idea. It was preempted in mid-1940 when the British began transferring enemy aliens to the island, mostly Jewish refugees already living in England. That said, during those precious eighteen months Bowman never discussed the proposal with Aydelotte, the State Department, or the REC. Doing so would have been consistent with his charge.

After the US entered the war, emergency rescue still was possible, as demonstrated by the War Refugee Board (WRB), created in January 1944. The WRB quickly carried out rescue initiatives in places such as southern Italy, Portugal, and northwest Africa. It opened a small refugee camp in Oswego, a rural town in New York State. The WRB saved over two hundred thousand Jews and twenty thousand non-Jews during its brief existence, and aided hundreds of thousands more. Much was accomplished in a very short amount of time, despite a small staff. The WRB came into being on the heels of a complaint to Roosevelt from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau that blasted the State Department's sabotage of rescue efforts. Breckinridge Long is usually portrayed as the puppet master of the State Department's refugee policies. But Long (whom Bowman called "Breck") thrived because a culture of antisemitism pervaded the department in which Bowman worked for six years. He was a key contributor to its wartime resistance to rescue attempts.⁵⁸

President Roosevelt launched a government research venture at the end of 1942 to consider options for settling displaced persons after the war. Known as the M Project (M for migration), it was a secret group based in Washington. Bowman was its chief advisor; daily management was handled by Henry Field, an anthropologist. The M Project overlapped with the Page School-REC studies, including the topics, authors, and places. Bowman received all reports and directed lines of inquiry. Keeping an eye on things was John Franklin Carter, an intelligence officer who was the White House liaison to the M Project. Bowman worried that Carter would tell the president that he was intentionally stalling, as in fact he was.

Between 1939 and 1945, the REC and M Projects consumed thousands of research hours and produced hundreds of studies (660 for the M Project alone)—all for naught. The Truman administration terminated the M Project on November 1, 1945, and its never-used reports went into storage. The way Bowman ran the two projects, says his biographer, was "a cruel categorical excuse for silence and inaction."⁵⁹ *

State Department. Bowman's affiliation with the State Department began in 1939 via a committee on postwar planning made up of business leaders and State Department officials. Bowman chaired the Territorial Subcommittee, whose remit included settlement, boundary disputes, and colonialism's future. In a 1943 meeting, he told the other subcommittee members what he'd said to

* The M Project's reports occasionally contained ideas that could have come straight from Madison Grant. One from 1945 said that miscegenation between "the White and Yellow races" would lead to a state "in the not too far distant years to come [that] must inevitably be the leveling off of the human race, with the extinction by hybridization of all existing primitive and semi-primitive peoples."

Roosevelt in 1938—that postwar resettlement of survivors was a problem for the Old World to handle. “If the leading powers would admit limited quotas of Jews and if the opportunity were given to the Jews to return to their original homelands after the war, the pressure of the Jewish problem [on the United States] would be greatly relieved.” At the time, there were warnings that if survivors of the concentration camps were repatriated it could result in murderous violence, as indeed occurred in several places after the war. For this reason, thousands of survivors avoided their former hometowns and migrated to displaced persons camps in the west. Bowman knew about these risks, having in his possession a 1943 report highlighting the threat.

Reasons for the inadequacies of America’s rescue efforts include public opposition to immigration and Roosevelt’s own shortcomings. The president’s desire to settle refugees quickly and on a large scale seems to have been genuine, although he gave mixed signals on how to proceed, and his inclination to act exceeded his actions.

Bowman was part of the State Department’s highest echelons. Yet he repeatedly undermined, delayed, and blocked the rescuing of refugees. Historian James Loeffler says that Bowman was the State Department’s “worst anti-Semite.” Bowman opposed the Nazis, although it did not translate into efforts to help the desperate. After an exhaustive review of Bowman’s activities, Neil Smith concludes that Bowman “abetted and contributed to the broad failure of the United States and Allied governments even to attempt a rescue of Jews and millions of other refugees from Europe.”

There’s no gainsaying the fact that Bowman played an important role in the State Department’s preparations for the United Nations. But his significance is difficult to gauge and was blemished by his bigotry. He was part of the State Department’s Agenda Group, created in late 1943 and tasked with developing the department’s agenda for the nascent UN. Chairing the group was Leo Pasvolsky, right-hand man to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Pasvolsky was the dominant figure at Dumbarton Oaks, where the UN was hashed out by the Big Four, and at the 1945 San Francisco Peace Conference, where the organization was birthed. He’s credited with having been the State Department’s foremost American contributor to the UN Charter. A Russian-born Jew, he arrived in America in 1905 at the age of 12. In San Francisco, Bowman alleged that Pasvolsky was involved in murky “relations with the Russians” (he spoke Russian) and that it was “a mistake to put one man with his background in a key position.” Earlier he’d accused Pasvolsky of playing “a cautious cat-like game” and alleged that he might have “communistic ideas” due to his foreign and ethnic origins. The insinuation that Pasvolsky might be a communist spy had the potential to destroy his career, although it appears that no one took the allegations seriously.⁶⁰ *

* Another disturbing incident at the San Francisco conference involved the human rights clause of the UN Charter. Bowman insisted on striking the words “Jew” and “Negro” from State Department statements on human rights. In a note to himself, Bowman seethed about a Jewish conspiracy at the conference, which Loeffler characterizes as “a crude concoction of anti-Semitic stereotypes.”

V. Final Years

Summary: The last years of Bowman's life were marked by mishaps and slights. At war's end, the White House turned its back on Bowman and cut ties with him. At Johns Hopkins, his attempts to create a School of Geography disintegrated as did the geography department, alleged to be one of his main contributions to the university. He spread rumors about a gay Harvard geographer that contributed to the closure of Harvard's geography department.

Government Exit. After assuming office, President Truman staked out policies that were antithetical to Bowman's approach. Truman launched an intergovernmental effort to bring thousands of displaced persons to the U.S. and called for the immediate admission of 100,000 survivors to Palestine. He pulled back the curtain on the State Department, singling out "an anti-Semitic bunch over there." Truman perceived the M Project for what it was—a useless waste. In Washington, Bowman had become *persona non grata*. * Come November 1945, Bowman told Henry Field that "my status in relationship to the Government [has] changed substantially, and by now I feel as much out of it as if I were a Republican." Preparations for the UN continued without him.⁶¹

School of Geography. The claim has been made that one of Bowman's main contributions to the university was the creation of a geography department in 1943. In fact, his role here was marked by a series of maladroit decisions. Establishing a geography department had been Bowman's dream since early on. When he arrived in 1935, he was met by a group of faculty concerned that Bowman would strip resources from other departments to create a geography department. Well before the department was established (without review by the Academic Council), Bowman invested much of his fundraising efforts on geography. The main contributors were two wealthy trustees and donors, Donaldson Brown and John Lee Pratt, with whom Bowman communicated for a decade about his plans for geography at Hopkins.

Problems cropped up early on. As we've seen, Bowman turned on two of the department's early members, Gottmann and Pelzer, who left the university. Bruman also departed. Bowman's reputation as an abrasive micromanager prevented the external hiring of a senior geographer to lead the department. Several individuals were approached, none was interested. To chair the department Bowman instead hired a quirky, mediocre scholar named George F. Carter, who had previously been dismissed from another position, and after leaving Hopkins would have his reputation shattered by charges that he had misrepresented geological data. The department floundered as Bowman sent prospective donors constantly changing prospectuses for the school. He called it variously the School

* Bowman had blind spots when it came to how others thought of him, as with the NRC. When University of Chicago historian Walter Johnson was assisting former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in preparing his memoirs in the late 1940s, he sought comments on the manuscript from several people. Bowman annoyed both Johnson and Stettinius because his reply, said Johnson, "seemed too intent on justifying his own wartime predictions and on lashing out at Roosevelt." In the margins Johnson wrote, "what conceit—the bastard." Stettinius, like Brown and Pratt, was a former executive at General Motors.

of Geography, School of Geopolitics, School of Political Geography, and School of International Relations (which would contain a geography department). John Pratt and Donaldson Brown, although unhappy with the situation, were kind to Bowman, at least to his face. A few months before Bowman stepped down in 1948, they successfully importuned the trustees to create the Isaiah Bowman School of Geography in his honor.

But Pratt and Brown had lost confidence in the School of Geography. Pratt was unhappy over the school's slow pace and inability to hire prominent senior faculty. Privately he approached President Detlev Bronk, Bowman's successor, and told him that he would not be making any more donations to the Bowman School because he didn't think it could "serve the broad concepts that had been intended." Pratt granted Bronk permission to withdraw his substantial donations and use them for unrestricted purposes anywhere else in the university.

Bowman might have accomplished more at Johns Hopkins had he not been away from campus for considerable amounts of time during his tenure. During Bowman's absences the person who ran the university was Provost P. Stewart Macaulay. Markley ("Reds") Wolman, a Hopkins professor and the son of Abel Wolman, another faculty member, said that "a lot of what a president does now, or five other people do now, Mr. Macaulay did." Bowman's main achievement was the creation of the university's Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in 1942. However, Johns Hopkins did not seek APL. Rather it was Vannevar Bush and Merle Tuve, a brilliant geophysicist with a doctorate from Johns Hopkins, who reached out first. Tuve, then at the Carnegie Institute, offered his alma mater the APL on a golden platter and became its first director.⁶²

Bowman retired before completion of his third term. He said it was because he'd promised his wife he would quit when he turned seventy, although the resignation may have been for other reasons.* He died in 1950 at the age of 71. Two years later, Provost Macaulay and President Bronk downgraded the Bowman School of Geography to the Bowman Department of Geography. Although Bronk preserved the department, he lacked confidence in it, labeling it "peripheral" to the rest of the university. He refused to allow the recruitment of a senior scholar. That same year Bronk also closed the Page School, which Bowman had used as an auxiliary home for geographers. The geography department shed Bowman's name in 1968, when it merged with environmental engineering to create the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering (DoGEE).⁶³

Shortly before Bowman stepped down, he was involved in a disturbing homophobic episode, one that would also implicate the future of academic geography. It began when Bowman was asked to join an ad hoc promotion committee for a Harvard geographer. The department's chair was Derwent Whittlesey, a highly respected scholar. Within the department it was an open secret that Whittlesey was gay. He lived for thirty years in a Cambridge apartment with his partner, who was yet another

* Bowman's internal reputation was affected by the postwar anticommunist hysteria. Among those alleged to have been Soviet spies were Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore, both of whom had been Bowman's close friends. Hiss, a Johns Hopkins alum, received an honorary degree at the university's 1947 commencement and honorary membership in the AGS, both thanks to Bowman. In 1948, charges against Hiss were front-page news, day after day. Bowman died shortly before Lattimore was publicly accused.

Harvard geographer. The ad hoc committee morphed into a consideration of the Geography Department's future at Harvard, about which the university was concerned. The discussion contributed to the department's dissolution the following year. The university had reservations about geography's overlap with other disciplines and the absence of a scientific core after its split with geology. But Bowman blamed the closure on the relationship between Whittlesey and his partner. He labeled it "pederasty" and told others that the department contained "a bad bunch of men." When plans surfaced to have prominent geographers send a letter protesting the department's dissolution, Bowman said that opposition was inappropriate given the "background" concerning Whittlesey.⁶⁴ *

VI. Bowman Drive and the Bowman Bust

Summary: Here is discussed the origins of the honors that Johns Hopkins University bestows on Isaiah Bowman. One is Bowman Drive, a campus road named by an unknown person in 1974. Another is a bust of Bowman located in the entryway to Shriver Hall. The bust was a stipulation in an alumni's will, written shortly after Bowman became president. It's not known why the donor sought the bust nor why the road was named for Bowman. The university recently removed murals stipulated by the donor, creating a precedent to do the same with Bowman's bust.

Bowman Drive. How did it happen that a campus road, Bowman Drive, acquired Bowman's name in 1974, nearly 25 years after his death? The short answer is, nobody knows. According to the university's senior archivist, there is no record anywhere that mentions the naming. Our research confirmed this. One may speculate about why and how the naming occurred, but evidence does not exist to support any hypothesis. A possibility is that at the time the Department of Geography was absorbed into DoGEE and lost the Bowman name, an unknown person felt that it would be appropriate to transfer the name to the road. Yet there was a six-year gap between the merger and the naming. Another conjecture is that an unknown person felt that the bust was an insufficient accolade to a former president. He or she acted *sub rosa* to rectify the situation. Whatever the explanation—and there may be others—naming Bowman Drive was never an official act of the university and we do not know why it happened.

Bowman's Bust. Isaiah Bowman's bust is in a dark recess at the entrance to Shriver Hall. The bust was a condition in the will of Alfred Jenkins Shriver, a Baltimore attorney and graduate of the university. Shriver wrote the will from his hospital bed in 1937. He promised a share of his estate for the construction of a "most modern and modernly equipped Lecture Hall," the quid pro quo for which was that the recipient meet eleven conditions.

The first was to erect on the exterior, in bronze or marble, life size statues of Daniel Coit Gilman, the university's first president, and Dr. William H. Welch, the School of Medicine's first dean and founder of what then was called the School of Hygiene and Public Health.

* Whittlesey was one of several people whose careers Bowman was prepared to damage to satisfy his prejudices. It also happened with Eric Goldman and with Leo Pasvolsky. Bowman's jealousy was another factor: Pasvolsky was superior at statecraft, Whittlesey the better scholar.

Nine murals were to be painted on the inside by “only the best artists.” Four were to display the original trustees of the university and the School of Medicine and their original faculties. Two would portray members of Shriver’s family and of his graduating class. Another was a mural he called “Philanthropists of Baltimore.” The subjects of the two remaining murals were quirky to say the least: “Clipper Ships of Baltimore” and the controversial “Famous Beauties of Baltimore,” whose design Shriver’s will specified in great detail. The “beauties” were local socialites, both living and deceased. Each was to be painted “at the height of her beauty.” A few years ago, the murals were placed in storage, where they remain, contrary to Shriver’s request. Next to last of Shriver’s conditions was a bronze or marble bust of Isaiah Bowman “to be placed inside the building or in some suitable place.” We don’t know Shriver’s motive for the Bowman bust. It’s possible but unlikely that Shriver was honoring Bowman’s university service, given that Bowman had been president for slightly less than two years at the time Shriver composed his will. It’s also been conjectured that Shriver feared that Bowman might take offense if Gilman, a geographer, was honored and he was not. There’s no evidence to suggest this is true.

The university accepted the will’s stipulations after Shriver died in 1939. The cost of complying was dwarfed by the funds it would obtain for construction of Shriver Hall. Had Johns Hopkins refused, the will stated that the bequest be offered to Loyola College of Baltimore, and if Loyola said no, the money would go to Goucher College. Construction of Shriver Hall, including the murals and sculptures, was delayed by the war.⁶⁵

Conclusions

In 2021, Johns Hopkins took a significant step by establishing a Name Review Board, an entity entrusted with the responsibility of deliberating the removal, renaming, or replacement of controversial campus iconography. Below the guidelines are underlined, followed by an explanation of how they apply to Isaiah Bowman.

1. The centrality of the offensive behavior to the person’s life as a whole. Throughout his career, Bowman deprecated those he viewed as inferior: Asian, Black, Jewish, Gay, and Indigenous people. Awful as his attitudes were, what was worse were the actions resulting from them. We can trace behavior driven by his prejudice from the time he was a graduate student through his resignation as university president.
2. The severity of his conduct. Judged by the standards of his day, Bowman stood out among his peers, albeit for the wrong reasons. He maintained a quota on Jewish students at a time when other schools were removing or raising theirs. He lied about the existence of the quota. Bowman fired or drove away eminent Jewish scholars and others. He made it more difficult for those fleeing Naziism to find places of refuge. In two instances he failed to aid fellow geographers who’d been arrested by the Nazis. He may have put lives at risk. Bowman personally blocked the admission of African Americans to the university’s undergraduate and graduate programs, again bucking the tide. He intimidated those who disagreed with his racial policies, and in one instance fired a faculty member whose spouse challenged him. His ideas about African American were rooted in pseudoscientific eugenic claims.

3. Relationship to the university. As a former president, Bowman inevitably played a part in the university's history. However, his dark side overwhelmed his achievements, such as they were. The report on naming principles refers to the concept of moral injury, defined as "the betrayal of 'what's right' by someone who holds authority." Bowman was not a moral leader. He harmed students, faculty, and the university's reputation. Today he is best remembered for his racism and antisemitism and receives little recognition for his career as a geographer and university president.

4. Possibilities for contextualization. We ask that the university place his bust in storage but retain in the same spot the pedestal on which it sat. On it could be placed a noticeable bronze or crystal box with a QR code linked to a range of sophisticated historical sources on the forces that shaped Bowman's career. Note, however, that Bowman's life is well documented. There is no possibility that he will be forgotten if the pedestal is removed as well.

5. Legal responsibilities. The university currently recognizes Isaiah Bowman with a bust in Shriver Hall and a road named for him. The bust was a stipulation in a gift from a donor. The university determined that it was legally permissible to remove murals that were another stipulation of the bequest. This established a precedent. The origins of the road's name are unknown. It was neither the result of a donor request nor action by the trustees.

Recently, a number of schools have removed former presidents' names from campus buildings. A partial list includes Bryn Mawr College, Caltech, George Washington University, Indiana University, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota (two presidents), Princeton University, the University of Southern California, and the University of Vermont. The presidents were deemed unworthy of public honors because of their endorsement of eugenic practices, promotion of exclusionary admissions policies, or public denigration of African Americans and Jews.

The situation at Caltech bears the closest resemblance to Johns Hopkins. There, the president and trustees removed the name of Robert A. Millikan, the university's founding president and Nobel laureate, from campus buildings. This was due to Millikan having served for several years as trustee of a group promoting eugenic sterilization in California. Millikan and Bowman were colleagues, and both held eugenic views. However, Bowman's bigotry was more extensive and it had far greater impact than Millikan's. On the other hand, Millikan's scholarly achievements and contributions to his university dwarfed Bowman's. Caltech's current president told the trustees that it is fraught to judge individuals outside their time but that Millikan had lent his name and prestige to "morally reprehensible" activities. He added, "How Caltech is experienced by current and future generations of outstanding scholars hinges on our ability to understand our past and underscore our values. The renamings will help position the Institute to retain and attract the most talented and innovative researchers [including students] from every background."⁶⁶ We hope that the Name Review Board and the president agree that the same holds true for Johns Hopkins University.

+ Paige Glotzer is a historian. She published a prize-winning book about the history of racial residential segregation in the United States, including in Baltimore. She is completing a book about connections between the rise of Jim Crow and colonialism and slavery worldwide. Glotzer received her PhD in history from Johns Hopkins University. Laurel Leff is a historian and journalist. She's published books about Jewish refugee scholars and the *New York Times* coverage of the Holocaust. Leff is the associate director of Northeastern's Jewish Studies Program and a former reporter for the *Wall Street Journal*. Sanford Jacoby is an economic historian and author. He participates in activities related to Jewish history and memory in Germany. We are grateful to the many individuals who've shared their expertise with us.

NOTES

¹ Steven Seegel, *Map Men: Transnational Lives and Deaths of Geographers in the Making of East Central Europe* (2018), 133; Saul B. Cohen, "Reflections on the Elimination of Geography at Harvard, 1947–1951," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, (1988), 150; Barney Warf, "Isaiah Bowman" in Warf ed. *Encyclopedia of Geography* (2010), v. 1, 296. Also see note 4.

² Jonathan Peter Spiro, *Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant* (2009); Jeremy Kuzmarov and John Marciano, *The Russians Are Coming, Again: The First Cold War as Tragedy, the Second as Farce* (2018), 46; Dennis Hodgson, "The Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America," *Population and Development Review* (1991); Robert C. Cook to Bowman, June 15, 1942. Lothrop Stoddard to Bowman, April 3, 1935, April 9, 1935, Isaiah Bowman Papers (IBP), Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University. It appears that some controversial items are missing from the Bowman Papers and possibly his papers at the American Geographical Society.

³ Hamilton Cravens, "Scientific Racism in Modern America, 1870s–1990s," *Prospects* (1996), 471; Elazar Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars* (1992).

⁴ Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1918 ed.) 16,77; Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (1915), 11-17; Huntington, *The Adaptability of the White Man to Tropical America* (1914), 192; Griffith Taylor, "Climatic Cycles and Evolution," *Geographical Review* (1919), 300; Taylor, "The Evolution and Distribution of Race, Culture, and Language," *Geographical Review* (1921); Marvin W. Mikesell, "Year One of the Geographical Review," *Geographical Review* (1986); Grant to Bowman, March 8, 1932, Bowman to W. Redmond Cross, Nov. 14, 1933 and Dec. 5, 1933, The Bowman Papers, Archives of the American Geographical Society (AAGS), University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee Library; Jonathan Spiro, *Defending the Master Race*, 345, 360; Jonathan Peter Spiro, "Patrician Racist: The Evolution of Madison Grant," PhD Diss. In History, UC Berkeley (2000), 358. Tying race and place had potentially dangerous consequences. At the 1919 conference, one of Bowman's principal roles was to oversee the production of boundary maps, a task he outsourced to the American Geographical Society. His approach, influenced by Grant and Taylor, was to draw boundaries based on ethnic groups. After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, German geographers relied on a similar methodology when devising ethnic settlement maps of Russia. The maps identified German, Polish, and Jewish areas to serve as a guide to the Final Solution and "ethnic reordering." Ingo Haar, "German *Ostforschung* and Ethnic Cleansing" in Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch ed. *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1919-1945* (2005).

⁵ Bowman, *The Andes of Southern Peru: Geographical Reconnaissance along the Seventy-Third Meridian* (1916), 100; Lea VanderVelde, "The Last Legally Beaten Servant in America: From Compulsion to Coercion in the American Workplace," *Seattle Univ. Law Rev.* 39 (2015).

⁶ Griffith Taylor, *Environment and Race: A Study of the Evolution, Migration, Settlement and Status of the Races of Man* (1927), 133; Huntington, *Character of Races*, 78; Grant, *Passing of the Great Race* (1918), 34; Bowman to

Grant, March 29, 1920 and Grant to Bowman, March 30, 1920, AAGS. The anecdote comes from James Stimpert, Reference Archivist, Special Collections, Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, email dated June 13, 2022.

⁷ Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (2003), 355, 357; Emma Tarlo, "Racial Hair: The Persistence and Resistance of a Category," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (2019).

⁸ Isaiah Bowman, *Supplement to the New World* (1923), 13, 17; Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Used of Human Heredity* (1985) 33; Madison Grant, "The Racial Transformation of America," *The North American Review* (1924), 347; "UCL Starts Process of Renaming Buildings Named After Prominent Eugenicians," *UCL News*, 11 June, 2020 at <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2020/jun/ucl-starts-process-renaming-buildings-named-after-prominent-eugenicians>.

⁹ Huntington, "The Negro Problem," *Geographical Review* (1921), 312-313; Grant, *Passing of the Great Race*, 16, 91-92; Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Old World in the New* (1914), 274; Samuel J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race: A Study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind* (1921), 36; Neil Smith, "Bowman's New World and the Council on Foreign Relations," *Geographical Review* (1986), 441.

¹⁰ Bowman, *Supplement to The New World* (1924), 13-16. On Grant and immigration policy see Daniel Okrent, *The Guarded Gate: Bigotry, Eugenics, and the Law that Kept Two Generations of Jews, Italians, and Other European Immigrants Out of America* (2020).

¹¹ William T. Rowe, "Owen Lattimore, Asia, and Comparative History," *Journal of Asian Studies* (2007), 769; Mae M. Ngai, "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924," *The Journal of American History* (1999); Bowman, *New World* (1921), 26-27.

¹² Laurel Leff, *Well Worth Saving: American Universities' Life-and-Death Decisions on Refugees from Nazi Europe* (2019), 3, 10-26; Sascha Becker et al., "Persecution and Escape: Professional Networks and High-Skilled Emigration from Nazi Germany" (2021) at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795203>.

¹³ Judith Friedlander, *A Light in Dark Times: The New School for Social Research and Its University in Exile* (2001); "Isaiah Bowman, "The University in Exile, Waldorf-Astoria Dinner, January 15, 1936," Box 143, Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars Records (ECADFSR), New York Public Library; Stephen Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses* (2009), 31; Bowman to Johnson, Nov. 14, 1935, Box 15, IBP; Leff, *Well Worth Saving*, 53.

¹⁴ Mayer to Morris Lazon, May 18, 1933, Box 35, ECADFSR; Rütten, "Ludwig Edelstein"; Laurel Leff, "Combating Prejudice and Protectionism in American Medicine: The Physicians Committee's Fight for Refugees from Nazism, 1939-1945," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* (2014). The information on the School of Medicine is based on secondary sources, annual faculty rosters, genealogical data, obituaries, and personal inquiries.

¹⁵ Stephen Duggan to Ernst Feiser, Jan. 12, 1937, IBP; Thomas Rütten, "Ludwig Edelstein at the Crossroads of 1933: On the Inseparability of Life, Work, and Their Reverberations," *Early Science and Medicine* (2006); Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury, *The Rescue of Science: The Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars* (1948), 196.

¹⁶ Knickerbocker to Finley, June 21, 1933, and Bowman to Knickerbocker, July 6, 1933, AAGS; Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald Stewart, and Severin Hochberg ed. *Advocate for the Doomed: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1932-1935* (2007), 70; Smith, *American Empire*, 293-294; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "The Critical Reading/Writing of Geopolitics: Re-reading/Writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste," *Progress in Human Geography* (1994).

¹⁷ "Educators Assail Poles' Jewish Curb: Step Viewed as Leading to the Abolition of Academic Freedom," *NY Times*, Dec. 20, 1937; Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*, 71, 220-223.

¹⁸ Bowman, "Some German Works on Political Geography," *Geog. Rev.* (1927), 511; Neil Smith, "Isaiah Bowman: Political Geography and Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly* (1984), 73; Philippson list courtesy of Yoram Bargel, University of Haifa; Henning Heske, "Karl Haushofer: His Role in German Geopolitics and in Nazi Politics," *Political Geography Quarterly* (1987); Mark Bassin, "Race Contra Space: The Conflict Between German

Geopolitik and National Socialism," *Political Geography Quarterly* (1987); Bowman to Emmanuel de Martonne, March 10, 1934, AAGS; Bowman to Lionel Curtis, Nov. 2, 1939, IBP; Trevor J. Barnes and Claudio Minca, "Nazi Spatial Theory: The Dark Geographies of Carl Schmitt and Walter Christaller," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (2013); Mecking to Bowman, May 1935, IBP; *Raumforschung und Raumordnung*, box 9-5, IBP; Smith, *American Empire*, 38-39, 283-289; Tuathail, "Critical Reading," 321-324; Karen DeBres, "Political Geographers of the Past IV: George Renner and the Great Map Scandal of 1942," *Political Geography Quarterly* (1986). On German geographers see Michael Fahlbusch, Mechtild Rössler, and Dominik Siegrist, "Conservatism, Ideology and Geography in Germany 1920–1950," *Political Geography Quarterly* (1989); Klaus Kost, "Anti-Semitism in German Geography 1900–1945," *GeoJournal* (1998); Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction* (2002).

¹⁹ Walter Behrmann, "Resolution of the Society" in W. Hartke ed., *Festschrift zur Hundertjahrfeier des Vereins für Geographie und Statistik zu Frankfurt am Main*, (1936), 438; Louis van Vuuren, *Tijdschrift Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* (1937), 238-245; Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 118; Harry H. Laughlin Papers, Truman State University, Box D4, files 6-8; Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (1994), 86; Isaiah Bowman to H.F. Osborn, Nov. 15, 1919, AAGS; Bowman to Daniel Willard, August 7, 1938, IBP.

²⁰ The seven were Friedrich Engel-Jánosi (history), Paul Friedländer (classical philology), Franz Michael (Chinese civilization), Leo Olschki (Romance literature), Leo Waibel (geography), Helene Wieruszowski (history and librarian), and Ernst Kantorowicz (medieval history). Kantorowicz expected a permanent position at Berkeley and while waiting to hear about it Bowman offered to take him on for a year. Shortly thereafter Kantorowicz went to Berkeley. Material about the various hires can be found in ECADFSR, the Bowman papers, and the Archives of the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Duggan and Drury, *Rescue of Science*, 196-197.

²¹ L.C. Dunn to Duggan, Jan. 3, 1939, Bowman to Duggan, Jan. 2, 1939 and January 9, 1940; L.C. Dunn to Bowman, Jan. 3, 1939, Betty Drury to Duggan, Jan. 3, 1939, all Box 10, ECADFSR; Bowman to Stephen Duggan, March 4, 1939 and June 27, 1939, Box 24 and Box 36, ECADFSR; Leff, *Worth Saving*, 181.

²² Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*, 32; Nathan Reingold, "Refugee Mathematicians in the United States of America, 1933–1941: Reception and Reaction," *Annals of Science* (1981); Duggan and Drury, *Rescue of Science*, 297, 200-204; Leff, *Well Worth Saving*, 30-34, 40.

²³ This section is based on Astrid Mehmel, "Alfred Philippson—Bürger auf Widerruf" in Claus-Christian Wiegandt ed., *Beiträge zum Festkolloquium aus Anlass der Benennung des Hörsaals in "Alfred-Philippson-Hörsaal,"* (2007); Hans Böhm and Astrid Mehmel ed., *Alfred Philippson, Wie ich zum Geographen wurde. Aufgezeichnet im Konzentrationslager Theresienstadt zwischen 1942 und 1945* (1996); Astrid Mehmel, "Alfred Philippson (1.1.1864 - 28.3.1953) - ein deutscher Geograph," *Aschkenaz - Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der Juden* vol. 8 (1998).

²⁴ Leff, *Well Worth Saving*, 68-69; Duggan to Waibel, May 26, 1941, and Duggan to Johnson, May 26, 1941, Box 44, ECADFSR.

²⁵ After the war, Philippson returned to Bonn and continued to publish until his death in 1953. Leff, *Well Worth Saving*, 69; Mehmel, "Alfred Philippson – Bürger auf Widerruf," 28-31; Email from Astrid Mehmel, University of Bonn, March 26, 2022.

²⁶ After leaving Hopkins, Gottmann went to the Sorbonne and then to Oxford, where he headed its School of Geography for fifteen years. Leff, *Well Worth Saving*, 86-87; Duggan and Drury, *Rescue of Science*, 194; E. Tomlin Bailey to Breitscheid, Nov. 22, 1941, and Sicherheitspolizei und des SD to Hofrats Schimpke, Dec. 12, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, file PAAA RZ214 101182 015; Smith, *American Empire*, 258-259; "Professor Jean Gottmann FBA 1915-1994," *The Geographical Journal* (1994).

²⁷ "Scholars without Money," *Time*, March 23, 1936; Robert Kargon and Elizabeth Hodes, "Karl Compton, Isaiah Bowman, and the Politics of Science in the Great Depression," *Isis* (1985), 307; Pietila, *Ghosts of Johns Hopkins*, 75; Smith, *American Empire*, 245, 256; Jon Gertner, *The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation* (2012); Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War*

America (2013), 33, 37-38; Robert Andrews Millikan Collection, Series III, "National Research Council, Correspondence re: Isaiah Bowman, 1932-1933," Library of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena (RAM).

²⁸ Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (1978), 281; Alan D. Beyerchen, "Emigration from Country and Discipline: The Journey of a German Physicist into American Photosynthesis" in Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, eds., *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933*, (2002), 80; Yael Epstein, "European Jewish Refugee Chemists in the United States," MA thesis, Michigan State University (2005), 49.

²⁹ Daniel J. Kevles, "Eric F. Goldman," in Patricia H. Marks, ed., *Luminaries: Princeton Faculty Remembered* (1996); Martin Ridge, "An Exile in Eden," *Pacific Historical Review* (1997).

³⁰ Jan Sapp, *Where the Truth Lies: Franz Moewus and the Origins of Molecular Biology* (1990), 177.

³¹ David S. Brown, *Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography* (2006), 38; David L. Nanney, "Candide in Academe Meets Tracy Agonistes: A Memoir of the Morning of Molecular Biology," www.life.illinois.edu/nanney/autobiography/candide.html#Anchor-The-37516s.

³² Vibha Kapuria-Foreman and Mark Perlman, "An Economic Historian's Economist: Remembering Simon Kuznets," *Economic Journal* (1995); E. Roy Weintraub, "MIT's Openness to Jewish Economists," *History of Political Economy* (2014); J.B. Donnelly, "The Vision of Scholarship: Johns Hopkins After the War," *Maryland Historical Magazine* (1978), 140.

³³ Elizabeth Fee and Edward T. Morman. "Doing History, Making Revolution: The Aspirations of Henry E. Sigerist and George Rosen" in Dorothy Porter and Roy Porter eds., *Doctors, Politics and Society: Historical Essays* (1993), 275-310; Smith, *American Empire*, 245, 260. Lovejoy was a founder of the American Association of University Professors, a proponent of academic freedom, tenure safeguards, and shared governance. They were principles that Bowman failed to respect, which was one reason for Lovejoy's departure He took a leave in February 1937 and was replaced by Dr. George Boas as the Philosophy Department's chair. Boas pleaded with Bowman that an effort be made to retain Lovejoy but this did not occur. Card Files, Office of the President Records, Special Collections, Eisenhower Library (OPR).

³⁴ The quota is discussed in Jason Kalman, "Dark Places Around the University: The Johns Hopkins University Admissions Quota and the Jewish Community, 1945-1951," *Hebrew Union College Annual* (2010); Marcia Graham Synnott, *The Opened Door: Discrimination and Admissions at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1900-1970* (1979), 16; Smith, *American Empire*, 247. The 1937 figure is from Antero Pietila, *The Ghosts of Johns Hopkins: The Life and Legacy that Shaped an American City* (2018), 71.

³⁵ Smith, *American Empire*, 247; Andrew S. Winston, "'Jews Will Not Replace Us!': Antisemitism, Interbreeding and Immigration in Historical Context," *American Jewish History* (2021).

³⁶ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944); Nicholas Lemann, *The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy* (1999), 29-78; Jerome Karabel, *The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton* (2005), 166, 194-199, ; Harold S. Wechsler, *The Qualified Student: A History of Selective College Admission in America* (1977); Seymour Martin Lipset and David Riesman, *Education and Politics at Harvard* (1975), 179-180, 190.

³⁷ Admissions practices are discussed in Kalman, "Dark Places," 246, 248-249, 251, 254, 257, 264; Smith *American Empire*, 247; Bowman to Carlyle Barton, March 11, 1948, IBP; Synnott, *The Open Door*, 16, 195.

³⁸ Kalman, "Dark Places," 263-267; Steven Weitzman, "American Biblical Scholarship and the Post-War Battle against Antisemitism," in Arjen F. Bakker et al. eds. *Protestant Bible Scholarship: Antisemitism, Philosemitism and Anti-Judaism, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism* (2022); Smith, *American Empire*, 267. For another description of the quota see, Interview with Sidney Offit, B.A., '50, Mame Warren, interviewer, Nov. 3, 1999, JHU Oral History Collection.

³⁹ Smith, *American Empire*, 247; Johns Hopkins Oral History Program, Interview of Arthur Sarnoff by Jennifer Kinniff, March 27, 2015, 16; Donnelly, "Vision of Scholarship," 140; Kalman, "Dark Places," 246-247. Albert D. Hutzler of the Hutzler department store chain was first nominated for a board seat was in 1937, when Bowman

was president, but he was not selected then. He was nominated again and joined the board fourteen years later, after Bowman was gone.

⁴⁰ Smith, *American Empire*, 247; Karabel, *The Chosen*, 636 n8; Robert Slater, "The African Americans Who First Entered the World of White Higher Education," *The Journal of African Americans in Higher Education* (1994).

⁴¹ Karen Kruse Thomas, *Health and Humanity: A History of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 1935–1985* (1965), 17-19.

⁴² The following are from OPR: Boxes 1-57, 1-59, and 1-74: Jacob H. Hollander to Bowman, May 25, 1939; Bowman, "Memorandum on Conversation with Mr. Edward Lewis," June 8, 1939; Edward S. Lewis to Bowman, July 25, 1939; *Baltimore Afro-American*, March 1938 and 1939; Bowman to Guy E. Snavelly, May 13, 1940; Bowman to Hazelton Spencer and Spencer to Mrs. Lane, August 7, 1940, and Spencer to Bowman, Aug. 15, 1940; Harold Hutcheson to Bowman, May 5, 1939; Smith, *American Empire*, 102-109, 267.

⁴³ Bowman to Robert Bowman, July 1, 1946, IBP; Isaiah Bowman, "The Twelve Houses of Heaven," in *The University and the Future of American* (1941), 16.

⁴⁴ Isaiah Bowman, "Science and Social Pioneering," *Science* (1939), 316; Bowman, "Our Better Ordering and Preservation," *Science* (1941), 192.

⁴⁵ Garland E. Allen, "Eugenics and Modern Biology: Critiques of Eugenics, 1910–1945," *Annals of Human Genetics* (2011); Pearl quoted in Kühn, *The Nazi Connection* (1994), 67.

⁴⁶ Julian S. Huxley and Alfred C. Haddon, *We Europeans: A Survey of Racial Problems* (1935), 297; Barkan, *Scientific Racism*. 235-248; 279-340; Stephen J. Whitfield, "Franz Boas: The Anthropologist as Public Intellectual," *Society* (2010); Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 251; Melvin Konner, "The Jewish Body? What is That?" *Journal of the Jewish Museum of Berlin* (2014); "Reports on Poland and Lithuania: Top Secret," Box 9, IBP; Kühn, *The Nazi Connection*, 48-50; Smith, *American Empire*, 300; Smith, "Bowman's New World," 443; Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews* (2013), 128. On the question of who knew what and when, see Laurel Leff, *Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America's Most Important Newspaper* (2005); Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (1998).

⁴⁷ *Higher Education for American Democracy: A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education* (December 1947).

⁴⁸ "4 Southerners Hit Education Report; College Leaders on Truman Commission Form Minority on Ending Segregation," *New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1947; John K. Pierre, "History of De Jure Segregation in Public Higher Education in America and the State of Maryland Prior to 1954 and the Equalization Strategy," *Florida A&M University Law Rev.* (2012); Neil King Cheek, "An Historical Study of the Administrative Actions in the Racial Desegregation of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1930-1955," PhD Diss. Education, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973; Edward C. Halperin, "Frank Porter Graham, Isaac Hall Manning, and the Jewish Quota at the University of North Carolina Medical School," *North Carolina Historical Review* (1990).

⁴⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, *Milton S. Eisenhower: Educational Statesman* (1983), 115; Kalman, "Dark Places," 278; *New York Times*, July 18, 1950; Michelle Brattain, "Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public," *American Historical Review* (2007).

⁵⁰ Bowman, *The Pioneer Fringe* (1931), passim; John L. Bernstein, "The Migration of Jews in Recent Years," *The American Jewish Year Book* (1936); Bowman ed., *Limits of Land Settlement* (1937).

⁵¹ Breitman and Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews*, 129-130; Smith, *American Empire*, 296-299, 310; Roosevelt to Bowman, October 14, 1938, Bowman to Roosevelt, Oct. 31, 1938, Roosevelt to Bowman, Nov. 2, 1938, FDR Library; Andrew Meier, *Morgenthau: Power, Privilege, and the Rise of an American Dynasty* (2022), 326; Bowman to Roosevelt, Nov. 25, 1938 and Dec. 10, 1938, JDC; Rebecca Jaeger, "Closed Door: America and the 1938-1940 Refugee Crisis," Honors Thesis, History, University of Delaware (2016), 26-29; Breitman and Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews*, 127-128; Beatrice Dain, "Triangle of Rescue: The Role of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and HICEM in NGO Diplomacy in Latin America During the 1930s and 1940s," Honors Thesis, Florida State University (2021), 64-65.

⁵² Monty Noam Penkower, *Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939-1945* (2002), 15, 222n57; Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (1970), 104-107; Breitman and Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews*, 120, 129; Smith, *American Empire*, 297, 304-307; Bowman to Charles Liebman, Oct. 18, 1939, JDC; Bowman to Roosevelt, Dec. 10, 1938, Roosevelt to Bowman, Dec. 15, 1938, FDR Library; "Texts of Talks by President Roosevelt, Hull and Lord Winterton," *New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1939; Bowman, "Memo on Conversation with Paul Van Zeeland," November 20, 1939, IBP; Welles to Roosevelt, Dec. 1, 1939 and Welles to van Zeeland, Dec. 6, 1939 in US Congress, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1939* (1956).

⁵³ Kim Wünschmann, *Before Auschwitz: Jewish Prisoners in the Prewar Concentration Camps* (2015); *New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1939.

⁵⁴ Bowman to Roosevelt, Dec. 10, 1938, JDC; Breitman and Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews*, 129.

⁵⁵ Bowman, "Settlement by the Modern Pioneer," 266; Bowman, "The Pioneer Fringe," *Foreign Affairs* (1927), 50; Bowman, *The New World* (1921), 181, 220, 222; Feingold, *Politics of Rescue*, 117; Bowman to Roosevelt, Nov. 25, 1938, FDR Library; Refugee Economic Corporation, *Quest for Settlement* (1948); Donnelly, "Vision of Scholarship," 140; Smith, *American Empire*, 298, 309, 313; Territorial Subcommittee, Minutes, June 11, 1943, IBP; Bowman to Charles Liebman, Jan. 9, 1939, IBP; Bowman to Robert Bowman, March 16, 1942, IBP; Correspondence re: Isaiah Bowman, 1932-1933, RAM; Bowman, *The New World* (1921), 181; Lucilla Cremoni, "Antisemitism and Populism in the United States in the 1930s: The Case of Father Coughlin," *Patterns of Prejudice* (1998).

⁵⁶ Bowman to Roosevelt, Nov. 2100, 1938, IBP; US Holocaust Memorial Museum, "German Jewish Refugees," <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/german-jewish-refugees-1933-1939>; Martin Gilbert, *The Holocaust: Maps and Photographs* (1992); Bowman to Liebman, Jan. 3, 1939, IBP; Mari Mariana Conea-Rosenfeld, *Wartime Bolivia and Refugees from Nazism: A Unique Case*. University of Miami, PhD Diss in Latin American Studies (2000); Breitman and Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews*, 132-133; Carrie Anne Endries, *Exiled in the Tropics: Nazi Protesters and the Getúlio Vargas Regime in Brazil, 1933-1945*, PhD Diss, History, Harvard University (2005), 13n3; A. Johnston to Bowman, April 16, 1940, IBP; Gerhardt Neumann, "German Jews in Colombia: A Study in Immigrant Adjustment," *Jewish Social Studies* (1941); Ronald C. Newton, "Indifferent Sanctuary: German-Speaking Refugees and Exiles in Argentina, 1933-1945," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (1982); Charles Liebman to Isaiah Bowman, March 21, 1941, IBP; Smith, *American Empire*, 304-307; Monty N. Penkower, "Eleanor Roosevelt and the Plight of World Jewry," *Jewish Social Studies* (1987); Carl O. Sauer, "The Prospect for Redistribution of Population" in *Limits of Land Settlement*, 23.

⁵⁷ Marion A. Kaplan, *Dominican Haven: The Jewish Refugee Settlement in Sosúa, 1940-1945* (2008), 85; Wyman, *Paper Walls*, 61; Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945* (2017), 201; Allen Wells, *Tropical Zion: General Trujillo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosúa* (2009), 85.

⁵⁸ Pelzer to Bowman, Jan. 20, 1939, Box V-5, "Settlement," IBP. On the WRB see, David Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945* (1984); Rebecca Erbelding, *Rescue Board: The Untold Story of America's Efforts to Save the Jews of Europe* (2019), 62, 172, 345; Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945* (1987), chap. 9 and 10; Rafael Medoff, *The Jews Should Keep Quiet: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and the Holocaust* (2021); United States War Refugee Board, *Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board*, Sept. 15, 1945; Michael Mashberg, "Documents Concerning the American State Department and the Stateless European Jews, 1942-1944," *Jewish Social Studies* (1977). Breckinridge Long to Bowman, Sept. 13, 1946, and Bowman to Long, Sept. 29, 1946, IBP.

⁵⁹ "M Project," series 9, IBP; Steven T. Usdin, *Bureau of Spies: The Secret Connections Between Espionage and Journalism in Washington* (2018); David H. Price, *Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War* (2008), 127-129; Henry Field to Bowman, Nov. 1, 1945, IBP; Abe Fortas to Henry Field, Nov. 19, 1945, IBP; Greg Robinson, *After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese*

American Life and Politics (2012), 21; Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: Empire, War and the Making of the United Nations* (2010), 111-117. Quotation in Smith, *American Empire*, 304. See also Matthew Frank, "The Myth of 'Vacant Places': Refugees and Group Resettlement" in Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch ed. *Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years' Crisis?* (2017); Henry Field, *M Project for F.D.R: Studies on Migration and Settlement* (1962).

⁶⁰ Minutes, Territorial Subcommittee, June 11, 1943, IBP; Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust* (2018); "U.S. Protest to Romania Urged," *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1941; Alex Grobman, "What Did They Know? The American Jewish Press and the Holocaust, September 1939–17 December 1942," *American Jewish History* (1979); Winifred Hadsel, "Can Europe's Refugees Find New Homes?" *Foreign Policy Reports*, Aug. 1, 1943; Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (2016); James Loeffler, *Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (2018), 15, 115, 119, 121; Smith, *American Empire*, 308, 310. San Francisco was not the first time that Bowman resisted legal protection for the rights of minority groups. He abhorred treaties adopted at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that granted cultural and political rights to minorities in several European countries. Bowman later sent a letter to president-elect Warren G. Harding "at the suggestion of our mutual friend Madison Grant" to urge Harding to reject the treaties. If Harding failed to take action, he wrote, the US would experience a breakdown in national unity, greater racial and religious differences, and the chance of disorder. Bowman to Warren Harding, Jan. 1, 1921, AAGS.

⁶¹ Lawrence Davidson, "Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (2010), 32; "Truman Statement on Displaced Persons," *New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1945; Isaiah Bowman to Henry Field, Nov. 6, 1945, IBP; Smith, *American Empire*, 404; Jack L. Hammersmith, "In Defense of Yalta: Edward R. Stettinius's Roosevelt and the Russians," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* (1992), 445; James Loeffler, "The Conscience of America: Human Rights, Jewish Politics, and American Foreign Policy at the 1945 United Nations San Francisco Conference," *Journal of American History* (2013), 420.

⁶² Bowman to John Pratt, Dec. 30, 1940, Nov. 2, 1944; Bowman to Donaldson Brown, Feb. 18, 1947; Donaldson Brown to Pratt, Feb. 19, 1947 and Feb. 27, 1947; Bowman to George F. Carter, Dec. 23, 1948, all from boxes I-223 to I-226, OPR; Smith, *American Empire*, 260, 266, 441-443; Stephen Williams, *Fantastic Archaeology: The Wild Side of North American Prehistory* (1991); Michael Aaron Dennis, "A Change of State: The Political Cultures of Technical Practice at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 1930-1945," PhD Diss, Johns Hopkins University (1990); Michael L. Hagler et al., "The APL Campus: Past, Present, and Future," *Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest* (2000); Michael Aaron Dennis, "Our First Line of Defense: Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State," *Isis* (1994); Interview with Gordon "Reds" Wolman, '49 by Mame Warren, June 22, 1999, JHU Oral History Collection.

⁶³ Bowman to Robert Bowman, Nov. 9, 1939, IBP; Bowman to John Pratt, Dec. 30, 1940, and Nov. 2, 1944, Bowman to Donaldson Brown, Feb. 18, 1947, Donaldson Brown to Pratt, Feb. 19, 1947 and Feb. 27, 1947, Bowman to George F. Carter, Dec. 23, 1948, Brown to Detlev Bronk, June 24, 1949, George F. Carter to Detlev Bronk, May 21, 1952, and other material in I-64, I-223 to I-224, OPR; "Page School to Go at Johns Hopkins," *New York Times*, April 17, 1953; Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, C-1, OPR; Michael L. Hagler et al., "The APL Campus: Past, Present, and Future," *Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest* (2000); Interview with Alexander Kossiakoff by Mame Warren, March 14, 2000, JHU Oral History Collection; Interview with Gordon "Reds" Wolman, '49.

⁶⁴ Bowman's role at Harvard is discussed in Neil Smith, "Academic War over the Field of Geography: The Elimination of Geography at Harvard, 1947–1951," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (1987). See also Smith, *American Empire* 386, 441-442; Richard Wright and Natalie Koch, "Geography in the Ivy League," *ResearchGate* (2009).

⁶⁵ Will of Alfred Jenkins Shriver, June 7, 1937, Shriver Hall Murals Records 1937 June, Eisenhower Library.

⁶⁶ Johns Hopkins University, “Committee to Establish Principles on Naming (CEPN) Final Report,” July 2021 at <https://provost.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Final-CEPN-Report.pdf>. “Caltech: Report and Documents” at <https://inclusive.caltech.edu/about/commitments-progress/committee/report>.